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
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EASTERN

F.O.  
371

1947



PALESTINE

File No. 46

pp. 8986 - 9322

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References:

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1947

Palestine  
EASTERN

E8986/G  
29 SEP 1947

95 31

E8986/46/C

Revisionist reaction in U.K. to  
UNSCOP report on Palestine

Mr Brown  
to Mr Halford  
SF210/UK/13.2a/HLB  
Dated 19 Sept  
Received 29 Sept.

Last Paper  
E8928

(Minutes)

It will be more interesting to  
see their reactions to our statement  
of policy.

*J. Cable*  
C.J.E. CABLE  
29/9

*H. J. Brown*  
Sept. 29

References

(Print)

(How disposed of)

61790

(Action completed)

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25/9

*W. H.*

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29 SEP 1947

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SECRET.

Box No. 500,  
Parliament Street B.O.,  
London, S.W.1.

SF.210/UK/B.3a/HLB.

ES986

Dear Halford,

29 SEP 1947

19th September, 1947.

Revisionist reaction in this country to the UNSCOP report on Palestine has disclosed some hesitation. The Revisionists are by no means in so strong a position, financially, or politically, as to be able to risk discouraging, by an ill-timed display of intransigence, those of their supporters who may consider the report more favourable than might have been expected.

The "Jewish Standard" of 5 September disparaged the recommendations of the majority of the Special Committee on the ground that they were likely to prove impracticable in the matter of the geographical division of Palestine and that they made no provision for the foundation of a Jewish sovereign state. Their arguments were not pursued with much force, however: instead, the Revisionist organ played for time by demanding that one only of the Special Committee's recommendations be approved by the Zionist movement, namely, the withdrawal of Britain from Palestine.

Abraham ABRAHAMS, in his editorial article, called for an immediate British withdrawal as a condition essential to the settlement of the Palestinian problem. Such a withdrawal, he claimed, would "completely revolutionise all aspects of the Palestinian problem", since "the British-Transjordan treaty itself will necessarily lapse, as British entry into Transjordan could be only by way of the Jewish and Arab areas". The Transjordanian Arabs should then, as ABRAHAMS' argument revealed, be at the mercy of the Jews. He drew attention to the thesis that "a comparatively empty Transjordan and an undeveloped and unprogressive Arab enclave of Western Palestine must in the long run fall under Jewish influence, its population must gradually be effected towards the more progressive and economically more powerful Jewish political structure, and must finally pass also politically into the Jewish area of administration and then into the Jewish State." ABRAHAMS' objection to the continuance of the British administration is clearly based on expectation that the British would stand in the way of Revisionist territorial ambition by preventing the absorption of Transjordan into a Jewish State until the Transjordanian Arabs were in a position to defend their interests themselves.

The "Jewish Standard" of the following week made little further reference to the Special Committee's proposals, but suggested that British policy would probably be to maintain the existing regime in Palestine while seeking American co-operation.

The American Revisionists, as appears from an announcement published by their organisation in the 'New York Times' of 12th September, find themselves in similar difficulties. They revealed their apprehension that the Special Committee's recommendations had met with more general approval than they could wish. Their argument consisted largely of deprecation of the Arab case, but their attitude was less equivocal than that of the British Revisionists. Having introduced the pretext that

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"the encircled Jewish zones will encourage intrigue and aggression from hostile neighbours" and that this condition "in consequence, will foster in Jewish Palestine a determined and irrepressible Irredentist movement which will seek to rectify by force of arms the wrongs imposed by political shortsightedness", the Revisionists' statement concluded by threatening that they "have no choice but to fight for an undivided Palestine."

One passage in the American Revisionists' statement perhaps indicates more clearly than anything else the cause of their embarrassment. "Today", it reads, "the Jews fight against Great Britain as a violator of international covenants. Tomorrow, if partition is accepted, they will have to fight against the whole world. They will be branded as aggressors." Revisionist propaganda will indeed have a more difficult task when it is no longer able to rely on stirring up animosity towards Britain. In the meantime, Revisionist policy appears to be to await events in the hope that there will be an opportunity to profit by dissension within the United Nations Organisation.

Yours sincerely,

  
H.L. Brown.

HLR/UB.

A.S. Halford Esq.,  
Foreign Office.

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1947

EASTERN

E9014 / G

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E 9014 / 46 / G

Reaction to Palestine announcement

New York

2665

Dated 27 Sept

Received 29 Sept

Last Paper.

E8986

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Minutes.)

Para. 2. We cannot announce a date for military withdrawal until the COs answer our question on this point: but after that the sooner the better.

As regards Mr Marshall's speech, it may well be that no commitment was intended. But as usual the USCJ were persuaded to <sup>in principle</sup> bless a solution favourable to the Jews.

UN (Pol) Sept.

File 610

J. S. Bevin  
Sept. 30

P. J. Farren  
✓ 1/x

BBB

2-X

(Action completed.)

27/10

(Index.)

W. J. H.

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F-9014  
30 SEP 1947  
P R I S E C

Cypher/OTP.

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

(From United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations)

No. 2665 D. 11.40 a.m. 27th September, 1947.  
R. 5.29 p.m. 27th September, 1947.  
27th September, 1947.

IMMEDIATE.

- - - -

TOP SECRET.

Following personal for Prime Minister and Secretary of State from Secretary of State for the Colonies.

Too early to gauge reaction to Palestine announcement but United States Delegate in Palestine Committee (Herschel Johnson) acknowledged to me clarity, courage and helpfulness of statement. The Arab delegates from Syria and Saudi Arabia have reacted so far more than favourably though they regretted we were leaving Arabs a mess of our making. The first comment of the Jews was that our announcement was designed to perpetuate our hold on Palestine. Later a feeling of disappointment emerged that we had not approved majority report for partition. They hope that the withdrawal will be speedy and United Nations will move quickly to assume responsibility. Their public announcement follows usual form. General comment is that there is only slim chance of two sides coming to agreement but the announcement has hardly had time to work and its implications as yet are not fully understood. The statement has secured great splash headlines. There is not much editorial comment so far but New York Herald Tribune had a most friendly and helpful leader today, concluding that "The British decision is as wise as it is honourable".

2. Though question often asked it seems to me too early to announce any date about withdrawal until attitude of parties more clearly defined. They will make statements early next week to the Committee but I will do my best to make them and Committee realise (we have tried already) that there is only a very limited time period available. There is uncertainty about the United States Government which is now under pressure from Jews and Arabs alike but it does appear that no commitment was intended by Marshall in his opening speech about majority report of U.N.S.C.O.P.

[Copies sent to the Prime Minister]

30 SEP 1947

30 SEP 1947

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Palestine  
EASTERN

E9068/G

E9068/46/C

Transjordan: local reactions  
to statement of policy and  
on Palestine

Amman  
292  
dated 30 Sept  
Received 1 Oct.

Last Paper.

(Minutes.)

E9015

*Rally*  
(5 E. CABLE)

References.

E8914/46/C

This has been made "Secret" instead  
of "top secret" and given Cabinet  
distribution.

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*Dr. J. Benin*  
Sept  
Oct. 1

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

*R. G. Amman*  
2/10

Confidential would have been enough.

*AMS*  
2.10

(Action completed.)

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*W. J. H.*

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11 OCT 1947

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on]

Cypher/OTP. DIPLOMATIC (SECRET)

FROM AMMAN TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

Mr. Pirie Gordon. D. 2.05 p.m. 30th September, 1947.  
No.292. R. 4.47 p.m. 30th September, 1947.

30th September, 1947.

Repeated to New York (U.K.Delegation)  
Bagdad - Saving  
Beirut - Saving  
Cairo - Saving  
Damascus - Saving  
Jedda - Saving  
B.M.E.O. Cairo - Saving  
Jerusalem - Saving

IMMEDIATE.

- - - -

TOP SECRET.

Your telegram No.1769 to Cairo.

Following are local reactions to statement of policy on Palestine.

Public at large treat the suggestion that the British are going to withdraw from Palestine with complete scepticism and do not believe either that this will happen or that U.N.S.C.O.P. report will be enforced. There is, at present, no press reaction as there are no Dailies here and none of the so called Weeklies have appeared since the announcement took place. King Abdullah, on the other hand, is distressed and regards the announcement of withdrawal from Palestine as confirmation of his worst fears that the British are going to abandon him altogether. He is anxiously asking when [grp.undec.] possible consultations with the Foreign Office as to how we suggest we shall carry out our obligations under the Treaty for military assistance.

3[sic]. Prime Minister who has the more informed opinion gives the statement general approval as being evidence of British good intentions as well as being highly desirable as shock tactics to reduce both Arabs and Jews to reason. Prime Minister is very pleased with the stress laid on article 6 of U.N.S.C.O.P. recommendations and proposes to urge that the British should not leave finally until displaced persons in Europe have been accommodated elsewhere. He argues that as long as they are available in their camps there will be nothing to stop the Jews bringing in fleets of immigrant ships the moment British control is removed. Samir believes that it is essential to deprive the Jews of their "raw material" for immigration propoganda but that once this is done a reasonable accommodation with them could be reached.

05

Foreign Office please pass to U.K.Delegation New York as my telegram No.1. [Repeated to New York]

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E 9116  
3 OCT 1947

1947

PALESTINE

Registry Number E 9116/46/31.  
FROM W. A. C. [unclear]  
No. Colonial Office  
Dated 75877/154/11.  
Received in Registry) Sept 30  
Oct 3

Political memo by Dr MAGNES.  
Encloses ten copies of further memo  
by Dr Magnes. entitled, "Do not  
dismember the Holy Land".

Last Paper

9068

(Minutes.)

B out. 3

References

(Print)

(How disposed of)

(Action completed)

J. C. [unclear] 4/10

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[Signature] 2/10/48

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Colonial Office,  
Church House,  
Gt Smith Street,  
London, S.W. 1.

enter  
11 E

75872/154/11.

September 30, 1947.

E 9116  
3 OCT 1947

*My dear Beith,*

--- I enclose two copies of a further memorandum  
by the indefatigable Dr Magnes which he has asked  
to be sent to the Foreign Office.

*Yours sincerely,*  
*W.A.C. Mathieson*

(W.A.C. Mathieson)

J.G.S. BEITH, ESQ.

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Do Not Dismember the Holy Land

(To appear in the New York Times  
about Sept. 25, 1947.)

It is only yesterday that I saw the full text of the report of the United Nations Palestine Committee, as printed in the New York Times of September 9th. Official copies of the text are not yet available here. The official Summary published two weeks ago omitted some decisive points, particularly with reference to the Minority Report.

I hope that what I am now writing may not be too late. According to statements in the Palestine press, practically all American newspapers, including the New York Times, are for the Majority report, which proposes the partition of Palestine. Mr. Marshall is also reported as having indicated yesterday the favorable attitude of the United States towards the Majority report for partition.

Nevertheless I feel it to be my duty to warn against adopting any such "solution". Partition will not stop the terrorist activities of Jewish groups. To the tension and warfare, which now exist, partition will add the Arab front, which hitherto has been quiescent. Partition will arouse the resentment of large numbers of Jews, of almost all the Arabs of Palestine, and of the Arab world. The Majority report itself says that force "on an extensive scale may be necessary for some time... Imposing a solution on both Jews and Arabs would be a basic condition of any recommended proposal".

Strangely enough, they do not feel themselves competent to recommend how this and through whom this should be done. There is no lack of willingness here, that this task be taken over by the Jews. But that would be that Jewish-Arab war which many have been trying to prevent these many years.

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There is no other way of peace here and in the Middle East except through a clear-cut policy which fosters Jewish-Arab cooperation, day-in and day-out, over an extended period. This is easier to "impose". Here we are together, Jews and Arabs, and the attempt to hold us apart through artificial boundaries, will indeed require extensive force. There is much more good will and readiness to cooperate between Jews and Arabs than the Majority report seems to be aware of. Even the intransigent Jewish and Arab political leaderships have not been able to destroy this. The effort to arrive at cooperation and understanding in a unitary Palestine requires less force and is much more practicable and workable and less mechanical than drawing these elaborate borders and thus precipitating the irrepressible conflict, which today does not yet exist.

The UNSGCP Majority admit that partitioning the country is not entirely to their taste. They seek to mitigate the evil by the formula: political partition - economic union. They call this "partial partition", that is, only partial sovereignty in the so-called sovereign states. Economic union is indispensable. But so is political union. The one without the other is almost meaningless. Surely everyone is aware these days, that a State's economic acts are also political in character. The Board which is to run the Economic Union is, for example, charged with establishing the tariff policy of the two hostile states. Who knows better than the citizens of the United States what basic political conflicts are at the bottom of every tariff policy? The Arab State will be primarily agricultural, the Jewish state primarily industrial - in that fact alone there are the germs of political conflict.

The only way of having economic union is by keeping Palestine whole and unitary. Once you set up these long and vicious political boundaries, all your artificial devices will not produce economic

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union. The one way to achieve irrigation, land reclamation and soil conservation is to keep the rivers and the rainwaters and the undersurface waters, the hills, the valleys and the coasts, the fertile and the arid lands in one whole Palestine, and not by setting up two hostile states.

The **UNSCOP** Majority admit that the Arab state is bankrupt from the very start. It is for the most part in the hills, which are largely barren and very costly to make productive. The Arab state begins, in accordance with the Majority's figures, with a deficit of over £ 9,000,000 in a total expenditure of over £ 18,000,000. The Jewish state, therefore, will have to help cover this Arab deficit. "The Jews will have the more economically developed part of the country embracing practically the whole of the citrus-producing area, which includes a large number of Arab producers"; and other reasons are given why, through customs and other services, the Jews are to make up a considerable part, this "arbitrary proportion", as they term it, of the deficit of the Arab state.

Is this not a demoralizing situation, politically and psychologically - with the Jews pictured as the rich uncle purveying baksheesh to the poor, backward relatives? How long can this last?

Will it indeed ever begin? The **UNSCOP** Majority threaten that if one state - presumably the Arabs - refuses to sign the treaty of Economic Union, the General Assembly of UN will take appropriate action. What action? Rejoining the Arab state to the Jewish, thus creating the Jewish state in all of Palestine, which the **UNSCOP** Majority reject as "extreme" and as "indefensible"? Or is this unviable Arab state to be annexed by Trans-Jordan, which is not a member of UN? Or is it to go to the other neighbours on the borders - Lebanon, Syria and Egypt?

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Yet the Majority are right when they declare that these common economic interests can not be partitioned since they <sup>are</sup> in fact inextricably bound together". Why then partition the country territorially, and thus lead to a loosening of these common economic interests? Indeed the Majority declare that the economic union, although it may have its political implications, "is dictated by the necessities of the overriding interest of unity". But this overriding interest of unity applies not only to the economic life and development of Palestine, but also to its Holy Places (as the Committee propose), and to Jerusalem (as the Committee propose). Why not then also to its social and political life and development as well? Without the unity of the country you are on the brink of chaos. With unity, you have a starting-point towards order and development.

A word as to Jerusalem. One can be grateful, that at least the Holy City is to be kept unpartitioned and demilitarized. That ought to be the pattern for the entire Holy Land - unpartitioned and demilitarized. If the United Nations were to declare the Holy Land to be a demilitarized territory, perhaps some of the great powers might lose their present interest in it, and perhaps the Jewish armies and the Arab armies might learn to convert their swords into ploughshares.

What a Jewish State - without Jerusalem! Jerusalem, the heart and soul of our tradition. Nominally a Jewish State - without Judaism. A Jewish State without Judaea, without the greater length and the outlet of the Jordan, without Western Galilee, where even today you can see the ruins of the beautiful synagogues built in Roman and Byzantine times. And it is not only the Jew whose heart must bleed over the mangling of this dear land with its sacred and inspiring history for Jews, Christians and Moslems.

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What a democratic Jewish State - beginning with possibly as many Arabs as Jews! In accordance with the figures of the UNSCOP Majority there would be to begin with, 500,000 Jews and 416,000 Arabs and others. But "in addition there will be in the Jewish State about 90,000 Bedouins", i.e. 506,000 Arabs and others, these "others" being but a handful. Other statistics show an even larger proportion of Arabs. The UNSCOP Majority declare this "considerable minority of Arabs to be the demerit of the scheme"; and it is recognized that the more territory you give the Jews, the larger the Arab population of the Jewish State becomes.

The balance is to be redressed by the admission into the Jewish State of 150,000 Jewish refugees during a transitional period up to September 1, 1949; and when the Jewish state is established thereafter, it will be able to make its own immigration laws with their "implicit limitation of immigration". It is possible thus to create a Jewish majority in the Jewish state. This will tend to overcrowd the already rather thickly settled Jewish areas of partitioned Palestine. The Negev could hardly count at first because to settle any considerable population there would take years and years, and millions and millions.

Both Majority and Minority reports favour increased Jewish immigration. That is the great step in advance. Whatever the fate of UNSCOP's proposals, the Jewish refugees should not be left in the lurch. There should under all circumstances be a large compassionate immigration to Palestine and elsewhere. But for anyone genuinely concerned with Jewish immigration, partitioning the country and forbidding Jewish immigration, settlement and land purchase in the area of the Arab state would deprive the Jews of those larger immigration possibilities they require. In this regard the Minority proposals, despite their opposition to partition in principle, are as truly restrictive and as thoroughly in the nature of partition as those of the Majority.

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But even a Jewish Majority in the Jewish State does not dispose of the "Arab problem" there. Doubtless one of the first things we shall be hearing of is the "Arab underground" there; then of repressive measures against it; then of the answer from the Arab side of the border; and thus the war of the irridentas will have begun even before the independence of the two states has been proclaimed. The Jewish army? The "token forces" of UN, if ever they come into being? Has not the history of the war and of the past two years in Palestine shown, that comparatively small underground forces, if backed by a considerable section of the population, can undermine the position of large, well-equipped regular armies?

It is largely the Jewish terror groups which have made the people of Britain weary of their task in Palestine. These groups have plastered the walls of Tel-Aviv with proclamations calling upon the Jews to follow them further. Having secured the partition proposals through terror, they are now prepared to secure the rest of the country for the Jews in the same way. If the Jewish State opposes them, that creates an additional front. Both the Jewish and Arab youth have been taught that violence, terror "pays". The Peel Commission proposed partition in 1937 after the Arab revolt. The Arabs refused to accept partition and, as a consequence, renewed their revolt. Then as a result of this came the White Paper of 1939. UNSCOP proposed partition in 1947 as a result of the Jewish revolt. To say, as the Majority do, that there is "finality" in partition is simply fatuous. It is but the beginning of intensified conflict. In view of this, it is interesting to find the UNSCOP Majority hoping for "reductions on police expenditure" as a way of lowering the deficits of both states.

The Majority are aware of the weakness of their proposals, and they finally admit that, when all is said and done, the real advantage of their "partial partition" is that it "satisfies the aspirations

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of both groups for independence".

But even that, by their own showing, is not correct. In another section of their report they say, that their partition proposals only meet "in part the claims and national aspirations of both parties". The wide powers of the Joint Economic Board and of the Governor of the City of Jerusalem are clearly in derogation of the national aspirations and the sovereignty of these so-called independent states.

Palestine is not just a Jewish land or just an Arab land. It is a common Jewish-Arab land, an international, interreligious land of Jew, Christian and Moslem. There can therefore be no such thing as full national independence for the Jews and full national independence for the Arabs of Palestine, partition or no partition. Why then partition the country? Jews and Arabs can however have the maximum satisfaction of their specific national and cultural aspirations in an independent, unpartitioned, bi-national Palestine, based upon the idea of two equal, autonomous nationalities.

The ~~UNSCOP~~ Majority themselves point the way. "The Economic Union is to be administered", they say, "by a Joint Economic Board in the composition of which a parity of interest in the two states is recognized by equal representation from them."

Why parity of interest, equal representation only in economic matters? Why not in social and political matters as well? Why then partition at all? Why not emphasize Jewish-Arab cooperation in all walks of life as the basis of your planning?

The ~~UNSCOP~~ Majority keep repeating the phrase and emphasizing the "irreconcilable" claims and differences of the Jews and Arabs. Yet they themselves say "there are no fundamental incompatibilities among them".

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Indeed the final passages of their Commentary on Partition are a paean to the whole idea of Arab-Jewish cooperation, of bi-national understanding and outlook - but in the Jewish State alone, with its large Arab population. But why? Why not keep the bi-national Palestine whole, and work towards understanding and cooperation in all of the country? That can come only from long, hard, systematic work, not through the stroke of a pen as with partition. Give the Jews and Arabs the chance they have never had of governing the independent Palestine together as equal peoples.

That brings me to the Minority Report. But I have no time or space in this statement to analyze it as it deserves. This report seems to me to have many weaknesses, particularly in its practical proposals, which do not always accord with its general principles. But the Minority Report has the outstanding virtue of believing Jews and Arabs can cooperate and of proposing that they build up a common citizenship in their common country.

For this reason I would urge that the Minority Report be taken as the basis of discussion, and that changes be made in it somewhat along the following lines:

1. The boundaries between the Jewish State and the Arab State should be abolished. Those boundaries constitute a form of partition, despite the federal nature of the State as a whole.
2. Instead of these almost sovereign boundaries, the unitary Palestine should be divided into counties, not necessarily contiguous, for purposes of local administration and no more.
3. The two peoples, Arabs and Jews, should be declared to have political parity, irrespective of who is the majority or the minority. This seems to be implied through the provision in the Minority report of an Upper Legislative Chamber constituted "on the basis of equal representation of the Arab and Jewish citizens of Palestine"; and by the provision that "Legislation shall be enacted when approved by majority votes in both chambers of the federal legislative body".

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4. That the Federal Court of Appeals on Constitutional matters be composed of an equal number of Jews and Arabs, and not of an Arab majority. This Court is of decisive importance, as a reading of its proposed functions will show. If necessary, the Chairman might be an appointee of the United Nations in some such way as is proposed for the International Commission on Absorptive Capacity.

5. That Jewish immigration be permitted in all parts of Palestine up to parity with the Arabs. This seems to be implied when the Minority Report excludes the possibility that the Jews, "by means of free mass immigration would become the majority population in Palestine". This does not however exclude Jewish immigration up to parity with the Arabs. Moreover, the International Commission on Absorptive Capacity, as proposed in the Minority report, should continue beyond the three years of transition and until Arabs and Jews reach some other agreement.

There are other points that should be dwelt upon - both positive and negative - but the above will suffice for present purposes.

It is clear that both the Majority and the Minority reports have made a sincere effort to produce constructive plans. Much can be learned from both reports. What a pity that both have been too much influenced by the immense propaganda in favour of partition.

This is the moment when the less intransigent among the Jewish and Arab leaders should get nearer together in view of the common danger of partition.

A few days ago a young Arab labour leader, Sami Taha, was assassinated. He and his considerable following had not been satisfied with the policies of the present Arab leadership. Despite the inner Arab terror, many thousands of Arabs from all walks of life attended his funeral.

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We are often asked if there are Arabs who are in favour of the bi-national Palestine. I should like to quote from an address by Fawzi Darwish el Husseini, another younger Arab leader who was done to death by Arab political assassins. He was the leader of a newly established party called "The New Palestine". He had been detained in 1936 for his active participation in the Arab revolt. Since then, he and many of the younger Arabs had learned a great deal and had changed their attitude towards the Jews. This is what he said shortly before his lamented death:

"There is a way towards understanding and agreement between both peoples in spite of the many obstacles. Agreement is necessary for the development of the country and for the liberation of both peoples. The condition for agreement is the principle of non-domination of one people by the other, and the establishment of a bi-national state based upon political equality and cooperation between both peoples in their economy, and their social and cultural life. Immigration is a political problem, and in the framework of a general agreement it will not be difficult to solve the question of Jewish immigration according to the economic absorptive capacity of the country. The agreement of the two peoples should receive international confirmation by U.N.O.; the agreement should assure to the Arabs that the independent bi-national Palestine will join a union with the neighbouring Arab countries."

This is the voice of an Arab brother, the authentic voice of our common Semitic tradition. It is as though he had heard the voice of the Hebrew Prophet:

"For Zion's sake will I not hold my peace,  
And for Jerusalem's sake I will not rest,  
Until the righteousness thereof go forth as brightness,  
And the salvation thereof as a lamp that burneth."

It is this voice which speaks out of the hearts of multitudes of Jews, Moslems and Christians. This is the true vision of the Holy Land to guide the United Nations, not the despair of the defeatists and the chauvinists.

Do not dismember the country. Do not estrange Jews and Arabs from one another. Lay down a generous bi-national policy and make Jewish-Arab cooperation the chief objective of this policy. Give the two peoples

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23

E 9119  
3 OCT 1947

PALESTINE

Registry Number } E9119/46/31.  
FROM }  
No. }  
Dated } 3/43  
Received in Registry } 22 Sept  
3 Oct

Protocols of Arabs in Palestine.  
Refer to P.O. 480 (E8011/46/31) transmits  
copy of note Volume 1479 of 22 Sept  
to Foreign Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Last Paper

9116

(Minutes.)

References

Mr Baker  
Copy Co.  
3/10  
JB out. 3

(Print)

(How disposed of)

8, 8.0.  
Oct 6

(Action completed)

5/2/48  
1/10

(Index)

[Handwritten signature]

Next Paper

9208

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No. <sup>343</sup> 236/75/47

24

~~His Majesty's~~ Charge d'Affaires at Bagdad  
presents his compliments to H.M.P.S.S.F.A.

and has the honour to transmit to him the under-mentioned documents.

British Embassy,

Bagdad.

E 9119  
3 OCT 1947

22nd September, 1947.

*Reference to previous correspondence:*

Foreign Office Telegram No. 780 of the 16th September, 1947 addressed to Bagdad.  
*Description of Enclosure.*

Name and Date.	Subject.
Copy of a Note Verbale No. 479 of the 22nd September, 1947 to the Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs.	Palestine Policy.



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**No. 472**

**NOTE VERBALE**

His Majesty's Embassy presents its compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and with reference to the Ministry's Note Verbale No. 1326/1326/237/13 of the 16th August, 1947 have the honour to state that while His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom understand the concern felt in Iraq over events in Palestine, they must remind the Iraqi Government that they alone are responsible for law and order in that country. The Palestine Government have reduced the disorder to the smallest possible dimensions, and will contrive to do so, firmly and impartially. The administration disposes of sufficient forces to enable them to carry out this task.

His Majesty's Government avails itself of this opportunity to renew the expression of its highest consideration.

British Embassy,  
 Bagdad.  
 22nd. September, 1947.



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E 9208

1947

6 OCT 1947

PALESTINE

Record of MANS POLLAK.

Registry Number E9209/10/31  
FROM Austrian Legation  
No. A 2152/2/47  
Dated 2 Oct  
Received in Registry 6 ~

Austrian citizen Mans Pollak has been living in Palestine throughout the war, is now in Austria, and has applied for permission to change his name. Asks for information of his record during his stay in Palestine.

Last Paper

9208

(Minutes.)

Ackge. and copy to Co.

References

What reply?

~~By Nov. 1st~~

JB Oct. 6

(Print)

In P.P. B.O. tel 2087 Paris 16/10

JB Oct. 21

(How disposed of)

by Dec. 1st

c.o. reminded

ack. Oct. 7

B.O. 11/1/48

J 3/12

24/ B.O. Oct 7

(Action completed)

(Index)

G.C. 10/1

[Signature] 10/1/48

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AUSTRIAN LEGATION

1, HYDE PARK GATE,  
LONDON, S.W.7  
TELEPHONE: WESTERN 0297-9

27

A 2152/2/47

E 209

The Austrian Chargé d'Affaires presents his compliments to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and would be grateful if assistance could be given in the following matter.

The Austrian citizen Hans Pollak had been living in Palestine throughout the war. From 1938 to 1945 his address had been Tel-Aviv, 139 Rothschild Blvd., from 1946 to the beginning of 1947, c.o. Pinati, Benjehudastr. 8, from where he had returned to Austria.

Hans Pollak has now applied to the Austrian Ministry for Home Affairs for permission to change his name.

The Austrian Chargé d'Affaires would be grateful if he could be advised of Hans Pollak's record during the latter's stay in Palestine.

London, the 2nd October, 1947.



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75009/1038/47

INDEXED

Saving.

From the Secretary of State for the Colonies.

E 9209/46/R, E 28

To the Officer Administering the Government of PALESTINE

21 OCT 1947

Date 16 October, 1947.

No. 2084 Saving.

I enclose a copy of a note from the Austrian Charge d'Affaires to the Foreign Office asking for any information on record concerning Hans Pollak, who resided in Palestine from 1938 to the beginning of 1947.

SECR.

Colonial Office Reference No. 75009/1038/47

With the compliments of the U.S. of S. Colonial Office.

Date 18 10.47

Reference A 2152/2/47  
E 9209/46/31

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<p>99 31</p>	<p>Palestine</p> <p>EASTERN</p>	<p>9247 / G</p> <p>7 OCT 1947</p>
<p>E 9247/146 19</p> <p>ADP/P (47) 39</p> <p>Terms of Reference</p> <p>Done as 30 Sept</p> <p>Received 6 Oct.</p>	<p>Withdrawal from Palestine: Administrative implications</p>	
<p>Last Paper</p> <p>E 9068</p>	<p>(Minutes)</p>	
<p>References</p> <p>E 9562/46/31 G</p>	<p>A second meeting was held yesterday at the Cabinet Offices to consider the attached draft report on withdrawal from Palestine. I attended and Mr. Riches came to represent the Egyptian Department. Mr. Riches explained the political complications involved in deploying further troops in Cyrenaica and the Sudan. It was agreed that withdrawal from Palestine could not be efficiently carried out without deploying troops to these areas and that, in view of the political factors, the paper should make this point clear and secure a ruling from <del>the</del> Ministers.</p>	
<p>(Print)</p>	<p>The timing stated in paragraph 5 within has been slightly upset. The amended paper will not now be taken by the Principal Administrative Officers' Committee until Wednesday, 15th October. It will then be taken by the Chiefs of Staff on Friday, 17th October. Barring accidents, we should have the Chiefs of Staff's paper on Friday night or Saturday, October 18th.</p>	
<p>(How disposed of)</p>	<p>I assume that the Chiefs of Staff's views will have to be submitted to the Defence Committee or the Cabinet before we are in a position to instruct the Delegation at New York about stating a time limit for our withdrawal from Palestine. This is likely to take a few days longer. Perhaps we should warn the Delegation that they cannot expect instructions on this point until after the 20th October at the earliest.</p> <p>The Chiefs of Staff are likely to give us two estimates:-</p> <p>(a) A minimum period for the total withdrawal, subject to high priorities in shipping and accommodation and to favourable political decisions in regard to sending troops to Cyrenaica and the Sudan, and</p> <p>(b) A "comfortable" period under which</p>	
<p>(Action completed)</p> <p>27/10</p>	<p>(Index)</p> <p>W/A</p>	
<p>Next Paper</p>	<p>such/</p>	

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such difficulties as the placing of troops <sup>under</sup> active service conditions in a barren country like Cyrenaica would be avoided.

Either period would date from the moment when a decision was taken by the Defence Committee or Cabinet. From yesterday's discussions it does not appear that the minimum period would be less than 8 months. There are certain parts of the work like general ~~advance~~ <sup>advance</sup> planning which could be carried out in advance of our setting a date for the beginning of withdrawal, and we may possibly wish to press for this ~~advance~~ <sup>advance</sup> planning to be set on foot straight away.

The Colonial Secretary recently telegraphed that in his view it was still too early to announce a date for the beginning of withdrawal. The fixing of such a date will in any case be the subject of consultation with our representatives on the spot at New York. In these circumstances and in view of the present pace of the Palestine Committee's debate, it seems that the arrangements for the Chiefs of Staff to take this matter on October 17th are adequate.

*D. G. S. Beith*  
Egyptian Serv.  
Services Liaison Dept.

*D. G. S. Beith*

J. G. S. Beith.  
8th October, 1947.

*R. G. S. Beith*  
V 8/x

The Secretary of State has very confidentially informed the Colonial Secretary, with the concurrence of the Minister of Defence, that the time to be allowed for withdrawal would probably be about six months. It seems certain that, when this question is considered by Ministers, they will feel that eight months is too long. The Colonial Office will be with us in wanting a quick withdrawal, as the last thing they want is to be responsible for administration for a long period with depleted military resources. I think it would be a good plan to tell the Chiefs of Staff representatives at a fairly high level, before their views become too crystallised, that it seems most unlikely that a period longer than six months would be politically acceptable as a minimum.

Mr Hayter  
Mr C. E. A. Warner

*R. G. S. Beith*

9th October, 1947.

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Minutes.

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The draft J.A.P. paper is being taken by the Directors of Administrative Plan. After discussion with the Secretary of the J.A.P. Plan, to morning morning at 11.15. A time we are unlikely to get our view across at this level and that it would be better tactics to wait until the paper is submitted to the C.O.S. (which is the next stage in the process.) We can then put our view to the C.O.S. by letter in advance of the meeting, and also arrange to be suitably represented at the C.O.S. meeting itself. We ought to have the paper, as revised by the Directors, by Saturday, and a letter could then be drafted to C.O.S. Secretariat. Mr. Hayter agrees.

Mr. Hayter  
All  
C. H. Johnston  
A.X.

Nothing to be Written in this Margin.

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All right. It is for consideration whether an letter should be from Sir O. Sargent to Gen. Hollis's "vacuum cleaners" or from the G/S to Min: of Defence. Even if the papers progress to the C.O.S. is unexpected delayed I think one letter should go ~~at~~ at the beginning of next week.

I hope I am right in gathering from Mr. Johnston's minute that C.O.S. are now likely to take the papers before Oct. 17<sup>th</sup> which with the further delay in going to Ministers which wd. result from that day being a Friday might well be running it rather fine.

*Griffiths*  
10/10

I submit an urgent draft to Gen. Hollis from Sir O. Sargent.

Although Gen. H. is away, Min: of Defence say it will be best to write to him

Services Liaison Dept. a/a again

23.4.  
d35 [initials] out. 13

It is now clear I. J.S. world as present with 15 files to the other 7

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6 OCT 1947

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Copy No. 32

TOP SECRETJ.A.P./P(47)39 (Terms of Reference)

7 OCT 1947

30th September, 1947.PRINCIPAL ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICERS' COMMITTEEJOINT ADMINISTRATIVE PLANNING STAFFWITHDRAWAL FROM PALESTINE - ADMINISTRATIVE IMPLICATIONSNote by the Joint Secretaries

In a recent paper<sup>+</sup> the Joint Planning Staff discussed the military problems raised by the proposal to withdraw from Palestine, all British forces and Administrative personnel by a specific date, irrespective of their being another mandatory power prepared to take over the responsibility of Government.

2. In a letter to the Chiefs of Staff the Foreign Office stated that it now seems certain that an announcement will have to be made during the present meeting of the United Nations Assembly stating a definite date for our withdrawal from Palestine.

3. Before a date can be announced by which our withdrawal will be completed it will be necessary to prepare a definite estimate as to the length of time required to move stores and personnel.

The Foreign Office suggest<sup>o</sup> that it would be most convenient to state the time limit in the form of a minimum and maximum period, e.g. not earlier than six months and not later than one year after withdrawal is begun.

4. In view of the fact that the Palestine debate is now coming on it is essential for this estimate to be prepared for the Foreign Office within three weeks at the outside.

5. In anticipation of instructions, therefore, the Joint Administration Planning Staff is invited to carry out the necessary examination, in conjunction with the Foreign Office, Colonial Office and Ministry of Transport, and to prepare a draft report to the Chiefs of Staff for consideration by the Principal Administrative Officers' Committee on Thursday, 9th October, 1947.

(Signed) C.W. WRIGHT  
G.C. MEARES*wed. 15<sup>th</sup>**Q.M.G.**Fri. 17<sup>th</sup>*Ministry of Defence, S.W.1.  
30th September, 1947.+ JP (47) 131 (Final)  
o COS (47) 207 (O)

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*Mr. Beth*

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DRAFT  
TO BE RETURNED TO  
THE SECRETARY  
JOINT ADMINISTRATIVE PLANNING STAFF

JAP/P(47) 39 (Revised Draft)

8th OCTOBER, 1947.

PRINCIPAL ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICERS COMMITTEE

JOINT ADMINISTRATIVE PLANNING STAFF

WITHDRAWAL FROM PALESTINE - ADMINISTRATIVE IMPLICATIONS

Report by the Joint Administrative Planning Staff

In anticipation of instructions we have examined a letter<sup>X</sup> from the Foreign Office to the Chiefs of Staff requesting an estimate of the length of time required to complete the withdrawal from Palestine. We have consulted the Foreign Office, the Colonial Office and the Ministry of Transport.

2. Our examination, at Enclosure, is in the form of a draft report to the Chiefs of Staff from the Principal Administrative Officers Committee.

X COS (47) 207 (0)

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, S.W.1.

8th OCTOBER, 1947.

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WITHDRAWAL FROM PALESTINE - ADMINISTRATIVE IMPLICATIONS

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Draft Report to the Chiefs of Staff

In anticipation of instructions we have examined a letter<sup>x</sup> from the Foreign Office to the Chiefs of Staff requesting an estimate of the length of time required to complete the withdrawal from Palestine. We have consulted the Foreign Office, the Colonial Office and the Ministry of Transport.

The Letter

2. The Foreign Office refer to a recent report<sup>\*x</sup> by the Joint Planning Staff on the implications of a withdrawal from Palestine, and state<sup>x</sup> that it now seems certain that an announcement will have to be made during the present meeting of the United Nations Assembly stating a definite date for the withdrawal. A definite estimate is therefore required as to the length of time required to move stores and personnel. The Foreign Office suggest that it might be most convenient to state the time limit in the form of the minimum and maximum period required for the withdrawal.

Comment

3. The report<sup>\*x</sup> by the Joint Planning Staff concluded that, if the announcement of our withdrawal did not induce the Arabs and Jews to co-operate, we would be faced with the following alternatives:-

- (a) We cease immediately to administer Palestine and confine ourselves to keeping such limited order as is necessary to ensure our withdrawal. In this event we should be faced with a difficult military operation of withdrawal with accompanying loss in life and property.
- (b) We endeavour to maintain law and order throughout the country until the specific date when our withdrawal begins. In this event very substantial reinforcements will be required.

4. We have, however, assumed in this examination that circumstances will permit the withdrawal of our forces and stores to be carried out as rapidly as the administrative factors allow. We have also assumed that the civil administration would be withdrawn concurrently with the Services as areas are evacuated. If further reinforcements are sent to Palestine, or if the withdrawal is impeded by the requirement of maintaining law and order throughout the country or as the result of obstruction by the Jews, Arabs, or Egyptians, then our estimate of the time required will have to be extended.

\* JP (47)131 (Final)  
x COS (47)207(0)

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ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEMS OF WITHDRAWAL

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5. The persons and stores requiring evacuation are set out in the following paragraphs.

Royal Navy

6. (a) Naval personnel and Admiralty Civilians to be evacuated will total approximately 130.
- (b) Stores remaining in Palestine.
- (i) 350 tons of Naval Stores (including office machinery and furniture) for local maintenance.
- (ii) 2,700 tons of non-explosive Mining and Torpedo stores. The Admiralty are considering the removal of these stores at an early date to the U.K.
- (iii) 3-4000 tons of Boom Defence Stores. It should be noted that this primarily consists of the boom at Haifa which is laid and will require one to two months to raise with the facilities available in the Mediterranean. It is planned to ship this to Malta.

Army

7. (a) There are at the moment some 68,600 British, local and Colonial troops in Palestine requiring evacuation. It has been estimated that this figure would have run down to some 55,000 by 1st April, 1948.
- (b) Considerable quantities of stores are held in Palestine for the maintenance of our forces, but these could be eaten down before our withdrawal is completed. The stores at Rafa Ordnance Depot lie, for the most part, in Egyptian territory and we assume that the removal of stores from this Depot need not delay our withdrawal from Palestine. We estimate that the remaining stores would amount to some 50,000 tons. Of these some 23,000 tons should accompany the troops while the balance would have to be moved to the Canal Zone to be absorbed in the Depots there. In addition there may be 13,000 vehicles.

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Royal Air Force

- 8. (a) There are at present some 4,600 Royal Air Force personnel in Palestine. In addition to the backing for the operational units under Air Headquarters Levant, (viz. two general reconnaissance and two fighter squadrons, three A.O.P. flights and the R.A.F. Regiment) the maintenance units in Palestine carry approximately one third of the repair and equipment load for the Mediterranean and Middle East theatre.
- (b) The R.A.F. equipment tonnages therefore are heavy in relation to the forces now deployed in Palestine. It is estimated that the total stores tonnages, including unit equipment, which would require evacuation, would be in the nature of 25,000 tons. In addition there might be 1,100 vehicles.
- (c) The closing down, movement and re-opening of the equipment and repair depots now in Palestine, will mean a considerable reduction for a period of six to nine months in the R.A.F. equipment and repair resources in the Mediterranean and Middle East theatre.

Civilians

9. British civilians to be evacuated comprise 750 administrative staff of the Palestine Government, 3,800 police other ranks and about 500 other civilians. If return of wives and families of Government Servants and other non-essential civilians takes place before evacuation is ordered these figures may be increased by about 500.

A certain quantity of police and administrative stores and vehicles would require evacuation, but no information is available on which to base an estimate.

Fixed Assets

10. Arrangements will have to be made for the disposal of fixed assets.

Summary of the Problem

11. The time taken to withdraw from Palestine would depend on:-

- (a) Provision of alternative accommodation,
- (b) Movement,
- (c) Planning and Preparation.

These are discussed in the following paragraphs.

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PROVISION OF ALTERNATIVE ACCOMMODATION

12. We have assumed that the forces in Palestine will move, as far as possible, to the locations where they will ultimately be deployed. These will be:-

(a) Army

- (i) Cyprus - one brigade and ancillary troops (total 8,000).
- (ii) Sudan - one independent brigade and ancillary troops (total 6,000).
- (iii) Cyrenaica - one division less one brigade, ancillary troops (total 20,000).

The above figures include the existing garrisons.

Other accommodation available in the Middle East is insufficient so that the balance of the Army in Palestine will have to be moved to the U.K. where accommodation is available.

(b) R.A.F.

- (i) Malta - two Long Range General Reconnaissance Squadrons (650 personnel).
- (ii) Canal Zone - two Fighter Squadrons to replace mobile fighter wing earmarked for Sudan (500 personnel). These squadrons will later move to Cyrenaica.
- (iii) Cyrenaica - Maintenance Units and R.A.F. Regiment (2,000 personnel) rising with arrival of two fighter squadrons to a total of 2,500 personnel.

In addition our land forces in Egypt will be running down to the Treaty levels and we assume that it will not be politically feasible to increase the Egyptian garrison over and above these figures, other than by troops in transit to their final locations.

Cyprus

13. There is at the moment accommodation available or in course of construction for a total of 5,000 Army together with administrative installations etc. The balance could if necessary be accommodated in tents as a temporary measure during the summer of 1948, by the end of which the camps now used for illegal Jewish immigrants should be available for the garrison.

Sudan

14. Permanent accommodation exists for 2,000 British troops only and it would be necessary to build new accommodation for the balance (some 4,000). This accommodation would take some two years to complete subject to the necessary priorities, and the troops would have to be stationed in another country until it was ready, since the very hot summer climate of the Sudan precludes the use of tented camps. It is politically desirable that the build up should be gradual.

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Cyrenaica

15. Without reference to the Middle East we are unable to estimate the amount of surplus accommodation available in Cyrenaica but we think that considerable construction will be required for the proposed garrison.

16. The poor port and communication facilities, the undeveloped water supply and the lack of local labour in Cyrenaica have recently been emphasised<sup>x</sup> by the Commanders-in-Chief, Middle East. Even if the bare minimum scale of accommodation (tented camps with hutted ancillaries) is accepted, we estimate that if work is started now it will not be possible to complete the necessary construction including roads, water supply etc. before the end of 1948 at the earliest, assuming that priorities are obtained for building materials and shipping. Married quarters could not be completed in this time.

17. We would emphasise that this construction work may have to be carried out to the detriment of other approved projects in the Middle East, in particular the construction of the store holding area in East Africa for stores ex Egypt. This will affect the rate of rundown in Egypt. We are unable, without reference to Middle East, to estimate the extent to which these projects would suffer.

18. If forces are to be evacuated from Palestine to Cyrenaica before the necessary construction is completed, then they will have to live in tents under active service conditions. The resultant hardships would be particularly severe during the winter, and the administration of the garrison will probably entail costly improvisation.

19. Unless a survey of Cyrenaica reveals a considerable amount of accommodation already available an adequate scale of accommodation for the garrisons would not be available before the end of 1948. Tented accommodation might be accepted from the middle of 1948 with emergency administrative facilities but before this time such living conditions would be extremely severe. So much so that we do not consider they should be justified in peace time. For example, there will be no piped water supply, electricity or cold storage.

MOVEMENT CONSIDERATIONS

Personnel Movement

20. It will not be possible to obtain an accurate estimate of the personnel shipping required to evacuate Palestine until the Service Ministries have completed their detailed examination of the consequent redeployment.

Provisionally, however, we estimate that personnel shipping will be required to move some 19,500 Service men and 5,500 civilians to the U.K. and some 41,000 Service men within the Middle East theatre. The latter figure might be considerably reduced if it were possible to obtain transit facilities through Egypt to Cyrenaica for a rail and road move. We do not however consider that the Egyptians would grant us sufficient transit rights to allow for an appreciable difference to be made.

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21. The necessary personnel ships could not be provided before April 1948 except at the expense of the demobilisation programme or the evacuation of India. Personnel shipping plans have not yet been made for the period after 1st April, 1948, but if sufficient priority were given to the withdrawal from Palestine, it might be possible to complete the personnel part of the movement in sixty days; the implications of attempting the move in this period would need further consideration.

Vehicles and Stores

22. If transit rights to Cyrenaica could not be obtained it would be necessary to move by sea some 4,000 Army and 500 R.A.F. essential vehicles and 20,000 Army and 23,000 R.A.F. tons of stores to Cyrenaica in addition to some 600 vehicles and 3,000 tons of stores to Cyprus. These moves would be oncurrent with the moves of personnel into these countries. By the use of all available naval and military L.S.T. from the Mediterranean and U.K. and such L.C.T. as may be in the Mediterranean, supplemented as necessary by commercial shipping, we estimate that at least three to four months will be required for the moves.

23. In addition to the first priority movement of the 4,500 essential vehicles required by the Army and R.A.F. in Cyrenaica, a further 8-10,000 Service vehicles and some 1,000 civilian vehicles also require to be evacuated from Palestine. Since port facilities are inadequate for their rapid shipment from Palestine, it would be necessary to despatch them to the Canal Zone to await disposal or onward transit to their ultimate destinations. This increase on the already large tonnage awaiting removal from the Canal Zone would add to the difficulties of the rundown of our forces in Egypt.

Civilian Families

24. We must draw attention to the recent announcement which has been made that in the interest of the morale and efficiency of the Palestine Administration that families of civilians can return to Palestine, which will add considerably to the problem of provision of shipping.

PREPARATORY ACTION

25. In the first place approval is necessary for the size and location of the new Army and R.A.F. garrisons in the Middle East; especially in regard to Cyrenaica.

26. Time will be required for general and executive planning before it will be possible to start on the movement of stores and the withdrawal of units onto the coast. General planning could be undertaken now by Middle East in advance of a decision by the Defence Committee, but executive planning must await a decision on the date of withdrawal. We estimate that one month will be required for general planning and a further month will be required for executive planning and preparations. It is estimated that six months would be required for the packing and movement of spares, the dismantling of essential plant, and the gradual withdrawal of units and stores to the coast or the Canal Zone.

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27. Considerable preparation will be required in Cyrenaica before it will be possible to accept units and stores from Palestine. We estimate that the period of four months before stores start arriving from Palestine will be barely sufficient.

#### CONCLUSIONS

28. On the assumptions given in paragraph 4 above, we conclude from the examination of the administrative factors, that provided:-

- (a) the development of Cyrenaica is accepted in advance of a decision on its future status,
- (b) adequate priority for shipping is accorded, including naval and military landing craft. If withdrawal is to be completed before the end of May 1948, interference with the evacuation of India or the demobilization programme will result,
- (c) high priority for building material and labour is accorded,
- (d) adequate financial approval is given at once,
- (e) no interference is caused by Jewish, Arab or Egyptian opposition,
- (f) a delay in the rundown of our forces in Egypt is accepted,
- (g) that portion of Rafa Depot lying in Palestine need not be evacuated,

the withdrawal from Palestine could be completed some fifteen months from the date of authority being given, when temporary alternative accommodation could be provided except in the Sudan.

Alternatively, the most rapid withdrawal from Palestine could be achieved in eight months from authority being given.

#### RECOMMENDATION

29. We recommend that

- (a) this paper be forwarded to the Foreign Office as an expression of the views of the Chiefs of Staff,
- (b) the draft telegram at Annex be despatched to the Commanders-in-Chief, Middle East.

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ANNEX

42

From:- Ministry of Defence

To:- Commanders-in-Chief, Middle East.

We anticipate that the Defence Committee will shortly take a decision to withdraw from Palestine.

2. We intend that the forces displaced from Palestine should be moved so far as possible to their ultimate peacetime locations. These will be:-

Cyrenaica	One division less one brigade two R.A.F. Maintenance units, eight R.A.F. Regiment squadrons and two fighter squadrons.
Cyprus	One brigade
Canal Zone	Two fighter squadrons.
Sudan	One independent brigade.
Malta	Two long range GR squadrons

The balance of surplus troops would return to U.K.

3. Since alternative accommodation for the Palestine Garrison does not exist at present temporary accommodation must be provided for them. The most satisfactory arrangement would be for temporary accommodation to be constructed now for garrisons in para second above at their final strengths. They could then assist in constructing their permanent accommodation.

4. We have estimated that it would be possible to evacuate Palestine in eight months from the date of a decision, but that it would take at least fifteen months to provide tented camps and hatted ancillaries.

5. If a rapid withdrawal is required, it may be necessary to move troops to Cyrenaica and Cyprus in advance of their accommodation being completed.

6. You should therefore prepare plans for the evacuation of Palestine, and the rapid development of facilities in Cyrenaica. We appreciate difficult conditions in Cyrenaica outlined in your 173/CCL, especially in regard to provision of administrative facilities and labour.

7. You should now limit movement of stores to Palestine and work on administrative projects there to immediate necessities for maintenance.

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From: Major G.C. Meares.



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE,  
GREAT GEORGE STREET,  
S.W.1.

11 NOV 1947

13th October, 1947

Tel. No.: Whitehall 7000

S.179/47

E9247

Dear *Burrows*.

Herewith two copies of the Joint Administrative Planning Staff's "Final" paper on "Withdrawal from Palestine - Administrative Implications."

The Principal Administrative Officers will be taking this paper at 11.00 a.m. on Wednesday, 15th October, 1947, in Conference Room C (First Floor), Ministry of Defence. Perhaps you would care to send a Foreign Office representative.

Yours sincerely,

*G.C. Meares*

B.A.B. Burrows, Esq.,  
Foreign Office.

*JB mme-7*

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Reference:

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61790

The circulation of this paper has been strictly limited.

It is issued for the personal use of Mr. B.A. Bennett **HLF**

TOP SECRET

Copy No. 59

J.A.P./P(47)39 (Final)

10th OCTOBER, 1947

PRINCIPAL ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICERS COMMITTEE

JOINT ADMINISTRATIVE PLANNING STAFF

WITHDRAWAL FROM PALESTINE - ADMINISTRATIVE IMPLICATIONS

Report by the Joint Administrative Planning Staff

In anticipation of instructions we have examined a letter<sup>x</sup> from the Foreign Office to the Chiefs of Staff requesting an estimate of the length of time required to move Service stores and personnel and to complete their withdrawal from Palestine. We have consulted the Foreign Office, the Colonial Office and the Ministry of Transport.

2. We have seen the High Commissioner of Palestine's recent signal<sup>φ</sup> but, for the purposes of this examination, we have assumed that civil administration facilities, though probably under military control, will be such as will allow our plan to be carried out.

The political decisions which will arise from the High Commissioner's telegram and the possibility of the establishment of some military administration of certain areas of the country will inevitably modify our conclusions.

3. Our examination, at Enclosure, is in the form of a draft report to the Chiefs of Staff from the Principal Administrative Officers Committee.

x C.O.S.(47) 207 (0)  
φ 1889 of 8th October, 1947.

(Signed) D.H. HALL-THOMPSON  
Ll. WANSBROUGH-JONES  
V.H.B. ROTH

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, S.W.1.

10th OCTOBER, 1947.

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ENCLOSURE

WITHDRAWAL FROM PALESTINE - ADMINISTRATIVE IMPLICATIONS

45

Draft Report to the Chiefs of Staff

In anticipation of instructions we have examined a letter<sup>x</sup> from the Foreign Office to the Chiefs of Staff requesting an estimate of the length of time required to move Service stores and personnel and to complete the withdrawal from Palestine. We have consulted the Foreign Office, the Colonial Office and the Ministry of Transport.

The Letter

2. The Foreign Office refer to a recent report<sup>x</sup> by the Joint Planning Staff on the implications of a withdrawal from Palestine, and state<sup>x</sup> that it now seems certain that an announcement will have to be made during the present meeting of the United Nations Assembly stating a definite date for the withdrawal. A definite estimate is therefore required as to the length of time required to move stores and personnel. The Foreign Office suggest that it might be most convenient to state the time limit in the form of the minimum and maximum period required for the withdrawal.

Comment

3. The report<sup>x</sup> by the Joint Planning Staff concluded that, if the announcement of our withdrawal did not induce the Arabs and Jews to co-operate, we would be faced with the following alternatives:-

(a) We cease immediately to administer Palestine and confine ourselves to keeping such limited order as is necessary to ensure our withdrawal. In this event we should be faced with a difficult military operation of withdrawal with accompanying loss in life and property.

(b) We endeavour to maintain law and order throughout the country until the specific date when our withdrawal begins. In this event very substantial reinforcements will be required.

4. We have, however, assumed in this examination that circumstances will permit the withdrawal of our forces and stores to be carried out as rapidly as the administrative factors allow. We have also assumed that the civil administration would be withdrawn concurrently with the Services as areas are evacuated. If further reinforcements are sent to Palestine, or if the withdrawal is impeded by the requirement of maintaining law and order throughout the country or as the result of obstruction by the Jews, Arabs, or Egyptians, then our estimate of the time required will have to be extended.

5. We have seen the High Commissioner of Palestine's recent signal<sup>ø</sup> but for the purpose of this examination we have assumed that civil administration facilities, though probably under military control, will be such as will allow our plan to be carried out.

The political decisions which will arise from the High Commissioner's telegram and the possibility of the establishment of some military administration of certain areas of the country will inevitably modify our conclusions.

x J.P.(47)131 (Final      x C.O.S.(47)207(0)  
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ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEMS OF WITHDRAWAL

6. The persons and stores requiring evacuation are set out in the following paragraphs.

Royal Navy

7. (a) Naval personnel and Admiralty Civilians to be evacuated will total approximately 130.

(b) Stores remaining in Palestine.

- (i) 350 tons of Naval Stores (including office machinery and furniture) for local maintenance.
- (ii) 2,700 tons of non-explosive Mining and Torpedo stores. The Admiralty are considering the removal of these stores at an early date to the U.K.
- (iii) 3-4000 tons of Boom Defence Stores. It should be noted that this primarily consists of the boom at Haifa which is laid and will require one to two months to raise with the facilities available in the Mediterranean and a further month to ship.

Army

8. (a) There are at the moment some 68,600 British, local and Colonial troops in Palestine requiring evacuation. It has been estimated that this figure would have run down to some 55,000 by 1st April, 1948.

(b) The stores in Palestine consist of

23,000 tons of ordnance stores.

9,000 tons of ammunition.

186,000 tons of engineer stores.

12,500 tons of timber.

13,000 vehicles.

together with short term stocks, which would be consumed during the period of the withdrawal. The Chief Ordnance Depot in the Middle East is at Rafa on the Egypt/Palestine boundary. Some of this Depot lies in Palestine and some in Egypt. It would be necessary to keep this Depot intact and not to vacate the element in Palestine if the plan for withdrawal of stores from Egypt is not to be dislocated. We estimate that some 20,000 tons of construction stores would be required for development in Cyrenaica before our withdrawal started and a further 23,000 tons would accompany the troops.

27,000 tons of other useful stores would require removal, probably to the Canal Zone to be absorbed in Depots there; this includes the ammunition and warlike stores which we assume could not be left in Palestine. The remaining stores amounting to about 160,000 tons, and of a value of about nine million pounds would be surplus.

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To summarise:-

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- (a) 43,000 tons will require shipment to other places in the Middle East.
- (b) 160,000 tons will require disposal.
- (c) 27,000 tons will require to be moved to Depots in Egypt. This quantity will not greatly add to the problem of removal of stores from Egypt.

Royal Air Force

9. (a) There are at present some 4,600 Royal Air Force personnel in Palestine. In addition to the backing for the operational units under Air Headquarters Levant, (viz. two general reconnaissance and two fighter squadrons, three A.O.P. flights and the R.A.F. Regiment) the maintenance units in Palestine carry approximately one third of the repair and equipment load for the Mediterranean and Middle East theatre.
- (b) The R.A.F. equipment tonnages therefore are heavy in relation to the forces now deployed in Palestine. It is estimated that the total stores tonnages, including unit equipment, which would require evacuation would be in the nature of 25,000 tons. In addition there might be 1,100 vehicles.
- (c) The closing down, movement and re-opening of the equipment and repair depots now in Palestine, will mean a considerable reduction for a period of six to nine months in the R.A.F. equipment and repair resources in the Mediterranean and Middle East theatre.
- (d) On evacuation some 23,000 tons of stores and 500 vehicles require shipment to the same localities as the redeployed units, and some 2,000 tons of stores and 600 vehicles will require movement to other parts of the Middle East or disposal.

Civilians

10. British civilians to be evacuated comprise 750 administrative staff of the Palestine Government, 3,800 police other ranks and about 500 other civilians. If return of wives and families of Government Servants and other non-essential civilians takes place before evacuation is ordered these figures may be increased by about 500.

A certain quantity of police and administrative stores and vehicles would require evacuation. Enquiries have been instituted but as yet no information is available on which to base an estimate.

Fixed Assets

11. Arrangements will have to be made for the disposal of both Service and Civil fixed assets.

Summary of the Problem

12. From the point of view of Service Administration, the time taken to withdraw from Palestine would depend on:-

- (a) Provision of alternative living and technical accommodation.
- (b) Development of Utilities e.g: Electric light and water in the new locations of the Palestine Garrison.

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- (c) Movement and disposal of personnel and stores.
  - (d) Preparatory action.

These are discussed in the following paragraphs.

PROVISION OF ALTERNATIVE ACCOMMODATION

13. We have assumed that the forces in Palestine will move as far as possible to the locations where they will be ultimately deployed. These locations are taken to be:-

(a) Army

- (i) Cyrenaica One Division and ancillary troops less one Brigade.  
(Total 17,500)
- (ii) Cyprus One Brigade and ancillary troops (6000)
- (iii) Sudan One Independent Brigade (5000)

The above figures include the existing garrisons. The provision of accommodation in these localities is examined below. No other accommodation exists in the Middle East, with the exception of East Africa and Malta, which might provide a limited amount of temporary accommodation, so that the balance of the Army in Palestine will have to be moved to the U.K. It must be realized, however, that there is not an inexhaustible quantity of accommodation in the U.K., and this balance can only be accepted provided that further training commitments are not imposed.

(b) R.A.F.

- (i) Cyrenaica - two Maintenance Units and R.A.F. Regiment (2,000 personnel) later plus two fighter squadrons. (500 personnel)
- (ii) Malta - two Long Range General Reconnaissance Squadrons (650 personnel)
- (iii) Canal Zone - two Fighter Squadrons to replace mobile fighter wing earmarked for Sudan (500 personnel). These squadrons will later move to Cyrenaica.

14. In addition our land forces in Egypt will be running down to the Treaty levels and we assume that it will not be politically feasible to increase the Egyptian garrison over and above these figures, other than by troops in transit to their final locations.

Cyprus

15. There is at the moment accommodation available or in course of construction for a total of 5,000 Army together with administrative installations etc. The balance could if necessary be accommodated in tents as a temporary measure during the summer of 1948, by the end of which the camps now used for illegal Jewish immigrants should be available for the garrison.

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Sudan

16. Permanent accommodation exists for 2,000 British troops only and it would be necessary to build new accommodation for the balance (some 4,000). This accommodation would take some two years to complete subject to the necessary priorities, and the troops would have to be stationed in another country, such as Malta or East Africa, until it was ready, since the very hot summer climate of the Sudan precludes the use of tented camps. It is politically desirable that the build up should be gradual.

Cyrenaica

17. Without reference to the Middle East we are unable to estimate the amount of surplus accommodation available in Cyrenaica but considerable construction and development will be required for the proposed garrison.

18. The poor port and communication facilities, the undeveloped water supply and the lack of local labour in Cyrenaica have recently been emphasised<sup>x</sup> by the Commanders-in-Chief, Middle East. Even if the bare minimum scale of accommodation (tented camps with hutted ancillaries) is accepted, we estimate that if orders to carry out the plan were given now, it will not be possible to complete the necessary construction including roads, water supply etc. before the end of 1948 at the earliest, assuming that priorities are obtained for building materials, labour and shipping. Married quarters could not be completed in this time.

19. We cannot assess the full implication of the construction work without reference to the Middle East. The shortage of supervisory and planning Staff, labour and materials is such that there is bound to be a very serious effect on the construction of the store holding area in East Africa. It is probable that considerable assistance from outside sources will be necessary in manpower and materials, and the rate of run down in Egypt may suffer though the degree cannot, at present, be determined.

20. Unless a survey of Cyrenaica reveals a considerable amount of accommodation already available an adequate scale of accommodation for the garrisons would not be available before the end of 1948, provided authority to carry out the plan can be given now. Tented camps with emergency administrative facilities might be provided from the middle of 1948 but the living conditions would be extremely severe and the administration of the Garrison would probably entail costly improvisation. For example, there will be no piped water supply, electricity or cold storage or proper hospital facilities. We do not consider living conditions of this nature should be justified in peace time.

MOVEMENT CONSIDERATIONS

Personnel Movement

21. It will not be possible to obtain an accurate estimate of the personnel shipping required to evacuate Palestine until the Service Ministries have completed their detailed examination of the consequent redeployment.

Provisionally, however, we estimate that personnel shipping will be required to move some 19,500 Service men and 5,500 civilians to the U.K. and up to 40,500 Service men within the Middle East theatre. The latter figure might be considerably reduced if it were possible to obtain transit facilities through Egypt to Cyrenaica for a rail and road move. We do not however consider that the Egyptians would grant us sufficient transit rights to allow for an appreciable difference to be made.

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22. The necessary personnel ships could not be provided before April 1948 except at the expense of the demobilisation programme or the evacuation of India. Personnel shipping plans have not yet been made for the period after 1st April, 1948, but if sufficient priority were given to the withdrawal from Palestine, it would be possible to complete the personnel part of the movement in sixty days; the implications of attempting the move in this period would need further consideration.

Vehicles and Stores

23. If transit rights to Cyrenaica could not be obtained it would be necessary to move by sea some 4,000 Army and 500 R.A.F. essential vehicles and 40,000 Army and 23,000 R.A.F. tons of stores to Cyrenaica in addition to some 600 army vehicles and 3,000 tons of army stores to Cyprus. These moves would be concurrent with the moves of personnel into these countries. By the use of all available naval and military L.S.T. (estimated at 10) from the Mediterranean and U.K. and such L.C.T. as may be in the Mediterranean, supplemented by commercial shipping, we estimate that at least four to five months will be required for the moves.

24. In addition to the first priority movement of the 4,500 essential vehicles required by the Army and R.A.F. in Cyrenaica, a further 8-10,000 Service vehicles and some 1,000 civilian vehicles also require to be evacuated from Palestine. Since port facilities are inadequate for their rapid shipment from Palestine, it would be necessary to despatch them to the Canal Zone to await disposal or onward transit to their ultimate destinations. This increase on the already large tonnage awaiting removal from the Canal Zone would add to the difficulties of the rundown of our forces in Egypt to a degree which can only be estimated by Middle East Authorities.

Civilian Families

25. We must draw attention to the recent announcement which has been made that in the interest of the morale and efficiency of the Palestine Administration families of civilians can return to Palestine, which will add considerably to the problem of provision of shipping.

PREPARATORY ACTION

26. In the first place approval is necessary for the size and location of the new Army and R.A.F. garrisons in the Middle East; especially in regard to Cyrenaica.

27. Time will be required for general and executive planning before it will be possible to start on the movement of stores and the withdrawal of units. General planning could be undertaken now by Middle East in advance of a decision by the Defence Committee, but executive planning must await a decision on the date of withdrawal. We estimate that one month will be required for general planning and a further month will be required for executive planning and preparations. It is estimated that six months would be required for the packing and movement of stores and equipment, the dismantling of essential plant, and the gradual withdrawal of units and stores to the coast or the Canal Zone.

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28. Considerable preparation will be required in Cyrenaica before it will be possible to accept units and stores from Palestine. We estimate that, apart from constructional stores which are required earlier, the stores could be accepted from Palestine some four months after the date of authority being given.

SUMMARY OF TIME FACTORS

29. The various time factors can be summarized as follows:-

- (a) General planning, which could take place as soon as locations are firm. One month
- (b) Executive planning, which must await a decision on the date on which withdrawal is to begin. One month
- (c) Packing, movement of stores and equipment, dismantling of plant and concentration for shipment. Six months
- (d) Movement of personnel. Two months
- (e) Movement of stores and equipment. Four to five months
- (f) Commencement of acceptance of stores from Palestine in Cyrenaica. Four months
- (g) Provision of tented camps in Cyrenaica with emergency administrative facilities. Eight months
- (h) Provision of tented camps with hutted ancillaries. Fifteen months

Many of these time factors will operate concurrently.

30. On the assumptions given in paragraphs 4 and 5 above and provided that:-

- (a) the development of facilities for a garrison in Cyrenaica is accepted now in advance of a decision on its future political status,
- (b) adequate priority for shipping is accorded, including naval and military landing craft,
- (c) high priority for building material and labour is accorded,
- (d) there are no delays in obtaining financial approval,
- (e) adequate internal movement facilities are maintained,
- (f) that portion of Rafa Ordnance Depot lying in Palestine need not be evacuated,

we conclude from an examination of the administrative factors that the withdrawal from Palestine to Cyrenaica, Cyprus, Sudan, Malta, Canal Zone and U.K. could be completed in some fifteen months from the date of authority being given. This time is dictated by the length of time required to build tented camps with hutted ancillaries in Cyrenaica.

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Alternatively the most rapid withdrawal from Palestine could be completed in eight months from authority being given only if extremely severe living conditions are accepted as a temporary measure for British troops.

RECOMMENDATION

31. We recommend that:-
- (a) this paper be forwarded to the Foreign Office as an expression of the views of the Chiefs of Staff,
  - (b) if this paper receives approval, a telegram should be despatched to the Commanders-in-Chief, Middle East, to initiate administrative planning for reception of the Palestine Garrison in their redeployment areas.

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Restricted.  
Open.

I.  
P.  
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FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

October, 1947.

*Cancel*

Draft.

IMMEDIATE

General Hollis,  
Ministry of  
Defence.

from  
Sir O. Sargent

I understand that the Chiefs of Staff will shortly be taking <sup>the</sup> paper prepared by the principal Administrative Officers' Committee on the administrative implications of withdrawal from Palestine.

The preliminary draft of this paper, reference JAP/P(47)39 of 8th October, concludes that "withdrawal from Palestine <sup>could</sup> will be completed in some 15 months from the date of authority being given, when temporary alternative accommodation could be provided except in the Sudan. Alternatively, the most rapid withdrawal from Palestine could be achieved in eight months from authority being given."

I ought to warn you that the political implications of so long a delay would be very serious. It is most important that, once decided upon, our withdrawal should be carried out rapidly. Otherwise we should be involved in serious difficulties, both in our relations with other powers and in the closing stages of the administration of Palestine.

In short, it seems most unlikely that <sup>maximum</sup> a period longer than six months would be politically acceptable. This is the ~~maximum~~ period which the Prime Minister, Minister of Defence and the Foreign

Secretary/

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

*Flight*

*Copy  
Sir T Lloyd  
C.O.*

*PP  
Parsons  
14/10*

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Secretary had in mind when they discussed  
the matter <sup>recently</sup> ~~on 4th October~~ and the Colonial  
Secretary in New York was informed  
accordingly by top secret telegram <sup>on Oct. 4<sup>th</sup></sup>

*I am sending a copy of this letter to  
Lloyd at the C.O.*

*5925-13 - 10/4*

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

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 9253 /G  
 2 OCT 1947

E 9253 /46 /G  
 C.O. commd  
 dated 2 Oct  
 Received 6 Oct.  
 withdrawal of British Forces  
 and Administration from  
 Palestine  
 re to Palestine 2329.

(Minutes)  
 Last Paper  
 E 9247  
 References  
 (Print)  
 (How disposed of)  
 JB out. 8

(Action completed) 25/9/47  
 (Index) W.P.  
 Next Paper  
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enter E/9

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Cypher (O.T.P.)

E 9253

7 OCT 1947

TO PALESTINE (General Sir A. Cunningham)

FROM S. OF S., COLONIES.

Sent 2nd October, 1947. 15.40 hrs.

IMMEDIATE

No. 2529 Top Secret.

Repeated to U.K. Delegation, New York, for  
Martin.

Situation may well develop at General Assembly in which we shall be obliged to state a definite date for the completion of the withdrawal of British Forces and Administration from Palestine. With this possibility in view, service and other departments concerned have been asked to prepare a draft report to the Chiefs of Staff for preliminary consideration by P.A.O.'s Committee on Thursday, 9th October, in anticipation of estimate being ready for cabling to New York within 3 weeks at the outside from now. It is thought most convenient method of stating a time limit may be in the form of a minimum and maximum period, e.g., not earlier than 6 months and not later than 1 year after commencement of withdrawal.

2. C.S. in C., M.E.L.F., will shortly be asked to make preliminary estimate in collaboration with you, and this estimate must of course take into account necessity for parallel or prior withdrawal of civil administration. In view of short time available before preliminary discussions here on this question it will be most helpful to have by telegram a brief preliminary statement of the major civil problems involved in withdrawal with such observations as you are able to make at this stage regarding possible methods of dealing with them.

(Copies sent to Foreign Office for transmission to New York)

Distributed to:-

R. 243  
Secretary of State  
Sir T. Lloyd  
Mr. I. Thomas  
Sir S. Caine  
Sir C. Jeffries  
Mr. Holding  
Foreign Office  
War Office (M.O. 4.)  
Ministry of Defence  
" " "

Mr. Martin  
Mr. Trafford Smith  
Mr. Gutch  
Mr. Mathieson  
Mr. Higham  
Mr. Galworthy  
Mr. Fitzgerald  
Mr. Barrows.  
Lt. Col. Charteris.  
Gp. Capt. Stapleton.  
Major G.C. Mears.

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<p>1947</p>	<p>Palestine</p> <p>EASTERN</p>	<p>9254 / G</p>
<p>F. O. Min Mr. Dixon</p> <p>Dated 200 Received 600.</p>	<p>Palestine: Suggested action</p>	
<p>Last Paper</p>	<p>(Minutes)</p>	
<p>References</p>	<p>Mr. Baird Oct. 7</p> <p>Tels 3318 to N.Y. and 1847 to Cairo have been from Cabinet Dict -</p> <p>RJF V8/x</p>	
<p>(Print)</p>	<p>See within</p>	
<p>(How disposed of)</p> <p>2) Mr. Addis NO 10 Mr Wood 4/200 000.</p> <p>10) New York 3318 3000</p> <p>8) Mr. Harrison H. 200 10) Cairo 1847 Oct. 7. Bagdad 840 F.O.</p>	<p>1. Tel to Palestine 2359 400.</p> <p>2. Tel to Palestine 2360 400.</p> <p>3. P.M.'s Minute 300.</p> <p>X <i>[Signature]</i> 11/10 X</p>	
<p>(Action completed)</p>	<p>(Index)</p>	
<p>Next Paper</p>		

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Beinā bī  
Damascus  
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W'lon 10162  
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C.O. Oct. 7~~

To) New York 3320  
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Rpō W'lon 10163

~~S) H/Def  
C.O. Oct 7 H~~

S) H/Def  
from Mr Dixon  
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S) C/Rep  
4/Def  
from Mr Burton  
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## PALESTINE

### Suggested Action.

(1) The Colonial Secretary to inform Mr. Marshall that our announcement that in the absence of a settlement we intend to leave Palestine seems to have been received with some scepticism; we are in earnest, and if there is no settlement by the end of the Assembly, we shall plan to withdraw; we do not intend to fix dates or limits, but the interval we have in mind is six months (this timing subject to confirmation by the C.O.S.); we trust that the United States Government will give due weight to the seriousness of our intentions, and will impress it on the Jews.

(2) Similar very secret communication to the Arab Governments.

### Eastern Department.

The above represents the action which the Secretary of State had in mind before he discussed this question with the Prime Minister yesterday. The action on which he and the Prime Minister agreed at their discussion is set out in the attached draft telegram to New York. The Secretary of State does not now think it necessary to make any direct communication at this stage to the Arab Governments through the capitals.

*Limit  
re drafted this  
to day 5/00*

*PD.*

2nd October, 1947.

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Reference: **FO 371** / **61790**

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NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

(18555) Wt. 43698-114 200m 2/47 G.S.St. Gp. 620

Registry No. ~~E9254/46/S~~

Top Secret.  
Secret.  
Confidential.  
Restricted.  
Open.

Draft. <sup>RC</sup>  
Gp. Capt. Stapleton <sup>DEC AFCC</sup>

Cab. Offices  
from Mr. Burrows

AB Oct. 2

29  
60

2<sup>nd</sup> Oct. 1947

IMMEDIATE

I enclose a copy of a <sup>draft</sup> tel. to the UK Delegation at N. York which has been prepared at the direction of the Prime Minister and the S/S, \* on the subject of British withdrawal from Palestine.

It is considered important that the U.S.G., the Jewish Agency and Arab

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Reference: FO 371 / 61790

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Arab Govts. should be  
impressed with the  
seriousness of Amey's  
intention to withdraw at  
an early date in the  
absence of a settlement.

I shall be grateful  
if you will be good  
enough to secure the concurrence  
of the COS in this draft  
as a matter of urgency

RASS

2-X

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

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Reference: **FO 371 / 61790**

COPYRIGHT OF THE PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

62

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

2nd October, 1947.

IMMEDIATE.

I enclose a copy of a draft telegram to the United Kingdom Delegation at New York which has been prepared at the direction of the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State, on the subject of British withdrawal from Palestine.

It is considered important that the United States Government, the Jewish Agency and Arab Governments should be impressed with the seriousness of His Majesty's Government's intention to withdraw at an early date in the absence of a settlement.

I shall be grateful if you will be good enough to secure the concurrence of the Chief of Staff in this draft as a matter of urgency.

(B.A.B. Burrows)

Group-Captain

D.C. Stapleton, D.F.C., A.F.C.,  
Cabinet Offices.

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Reference:  
**FO** 371 / 61790

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NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Registry  
No. **E**

1G

October, 1947.

63

P.J.D.

*Draft.*

J. Addis,  
10, Downing Street.

R. Wood,  
Ministry of Defence.

IMMEDIATE

SECRET

The Prime Minister, the Foreign Secretary and the Minister of Defence discussed last night the sending of a telegram to the Colonial Secretary and Minister of State in New York about Palestine. On Mr. Bevin's instructions

I enclose a draft telegram to New York and a draft telegram to our Representatives in the Arab States.

Would you let me know as soon as possible whether the Prime Minister approves

whether the Minister of Defence concurs.

3/10.

MB

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Reference:

FO 371 / 61790

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P. 64  
FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.,

E9254/46/9. 3rd October, 1947.

IMMEDIATE.

SECRET.

The Prime Minister, the Foreign Secretary and the Minister of Defence discussed last night the sending of a telegram to the Colonial Secretary and Minister of State in New York about Palestine. On Mr. Bevin's instructions I enclose a draft telegram to New York and a draft telegram to our Representatives in the Arab States.

Would you let me know as soon as possible whether the Prime Minister approves?

(Sd.) P. J. DIXON

J.M. Addis, Esq.,  
10 Downing Street,  
S.W.1.

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Reference:

FO

371

61790

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65

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.,

E9254/46/9

3rd October, 1947.

IMMEDIATE.

SECRET.

The Prime Minister, the Foreign Secretary and the Minister of Defence discussed last night the sending of a telegram to the Colonial Secretary and Minister of State in New York about Palestine. On Mr. Bevin's instructions I enclose a draft telegram to New York and a draft telegram to our Representatives in the Arab States.

Would you let me know as soon as possible whether the Minister of Defence concurs?

(Sd.) P. J. DIXON

R. Wood, Esq.,  
Ministry of Defence.

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Reference: **FO 371 / 61790**

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66

COPY

Draft telegram to:

Sir A. Cadogan,  
New York.

IMPORTANT.

DEDIP.

SECRET.

Following for Colonial Secretary and  
Minister of State from the Secretary of State.

No.

Cypher.

Repeat to:

Washington,  
Jerusalem,  
Cairo,  
Bagdad,  
Jedda,  
Amman,  
Beirut,  
Damascus.

Distribution:

Diplomatic Secret.

The Prime Minister and I have been  
considering the reactions to date to our  
statement on Palestine of September 26th.  
It strikes us that both the Arabs and the  
Jews, and possibly also the United States,  
are treating with some amount of scepticism  
our announcement that we would withdraw  
both arms and administration from Palestine  
in the absence of a settlement. We do not  
want publicly to confront the United States  
with a deadline by making any further  
public pronouncement at the moment, but we  
suggest that you should take any  
opportunity in conversations with Americans  
and Representatives of Jews and Arabs to  
make it clear that they must be in no doubt  
of our determined intention to carry out  
the policy contained in your statement of  
September 26th. Neither can they assure  
that the delay can be very long before  
withdrawal after it has become plain that  
settlement is impossible.

TOP SECRET.

2. For your own private information  
not for use in your conversation

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Reference: **FO 371 / 61790**

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67

Minister, Minister of Defence and I have been thinking of a maximum period of six months, subject to the final views of our military experts on the practicable date of withdrawal. No period should be mentioned in your conversations but the shortness of time can be emphasised.

3. We think it important that those concerned should realise that there is increasing restiveness on the part of H.M.G. and the public generally at our very difficult situation. Illegal immigration is still being encouraged. If Palestine were British territory we should be able to deal with the situation. As things are, we are bound by the provisions of the Mandate which we have loyally attempted to carry out.

4. Silver's statement as reported in today's press makes it all the more important that the Jews and the Americans should be brought to understand the true position. I am anxious that Marshall personally shall know where we stand. I am also instructing H.M. Representatives with the Arab Governments (see my telegram repeated to you as my immediately following telegram) to bring the position home to them.

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Reference:

FO

371

61790

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68

Draft telegram to:

Jerusalem,  
Cairo,  
Bagdad,  
Jedda,  
Amman,  
Beirut,  
Damascus.

IMPORTANT.

DEDIP.

SECRET.

My telegram to New York No.

You should use the material  
contained in my telegram under  
reference in conversations with the  
Government to which you are  
accredited.

No.

Cypher.

2. I feel that the Arabs as  
a whole have been treating this  
serious question much too lightly.

Repeat to:

Sir A. Cadogan,  
New York,

Washington.

Distribution:  
Diplomatic Secret.

1	2	3	4	5	6

Reference:

FO 371 / 61790

COPYRIGHT OF THE PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

*put with*



FOREIGN SECRETARY  
10, DOWNING STREET,  
WHITEHALL,

*69*

**E9254/46/9**

9 OCT 1947

COPY OF MINUTE BY THE PRIME MINISTER.

Reference: Private Secretary, Foreign Office to Mr. Addis, dated 3.10.47, attaching draft telegrams from Foreign Secretary to New York and to Representatives in the Arab States.

"Approved,

C.R.A.

3.10.47"

*Typs were despatched last night.*

*Eastern Dept.*

*PD 4/60*

Copy also sent to:

*K. 3/0147.*

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Reference:

**FO 371 / 61790**

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Palastini

70

The P.M. has approved the  
draft ltr. as they stand.

The Minister of Defence considers  
it too dangerous to acquaint so  
many of our repr. in the Arab  
States with the planning date,  
and, in the absence of the S.G.S.,  
I have agreed that the para.

(para. 2) in our tel. to  
New York should be sent in a  
separate tel. top secret & personal  
to the Colonial Secretary & the  
Minister of State repeated for his  
top secret & personal information  
to the Ambassador at Washington.

3 tels. sent

JB out. 3

P.B.

3/10 -

Nothing to be Written in this Margin.

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Reference: **FO 371** / 61790

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Palestine

As a result of a further  
~~cover~~ discussion between the P.M. &  
 the S.G.S., at which the Minister of  
 Defence was present, the S.G.S.  
 wishes to recast the Tel. to  
 New York on the lines of the  
 attached redraft. I also  
 attach a draft tel. to our  
 representatives in the Arab states.

The draft tcls. should be seen  
 by the P.M. & the Minister of Defence  
 before despatch.

P.S.  
 3/10.

Nothing to be Written in this Margin.

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Reference:

FO 371 / 61790



**MEDIATE**

72

L. 17.  
(CODE 11-17-0)

To be typed  
out, but will  
to go in for  
particular report

**IMMEDIATE**

me -

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Reference:

FO 371 / 61790

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Registry  
No. E

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73

P.D.

~~Draft~~  
Sir A. Cadogan,  
NEW YORK.

Despatched

M.

Telegram

No....

Cypher

Diplomatic Secret.

IMPORTANT.

DEDIP

SECRET.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Repeat to:

WASHINGTON.

Jerusalem

Cairo

Bagdad

Jedda

Amman

Beruit

Damascus

A Following for Colonial Secretary and  
Minister of State from the Secretary of  
State.

The Prime Minister and I have been  
considering the reactions to date <sup>to</sup> of our  
statement on Palestine on September 26th.  
It strikes us that both the Arabs and the  
Jews, and possibly also the United States,  
are treating with some amount of scepticism  
~~our intention to leave Palestine in the~~ B  
absence of a settlement. We do not want  
publicly to confront the United States with ~~the~~ a  
by making deadline ~~or to make~~ any further pronouncement  
at the moment, but we are anxious to  
hammer in the conviction that there is no  
doubt that, in the absence of a settlement,  
we shall withdraw whatever the consequences.  
We also think it right that it should be  
to the U.S.G., the Arab Govts. and the Jewish Agency  
~~known that our tentative feeling is that the~~

withdrawal should be planned to be complete  
by about six months after the end of the  
present session of the General Assembly if  
there is no settlement by then.  
C NY We think it important that those  
concerned should realise that there is  
increasing restiveness on the part of  
H.M.G. and the public generally at our  
very/

(Subject to the final views of our military experts on the practicable rate of withdrawal)

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Reference: **FO 371** / 61790

74

very difficult situation. Illegal immigration, it appears, is still being encouraged. If Palestine were British territory we should be able to deal with the situation. As things are, we <sup>are</sup> bound by the provisions of the Mandate which we have loyally attempted to carry out. D

3. The foregoing is for your guidance in any conversations you have with representatives of the Jews and Arabs. <sup>and with American...</sup> I am also anxious that Marshall personally shall know where we stand.

and for the guidance of HMAR in conversation with Arab Coms.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

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Reference: FO 371 / 61790



Registry  
No. E

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P.D.

Despatched 7.35A M. 10

Draft

Sir A. Cadogan,  
NEW YORK.

Telegram

No. 3318

Cypher

Diplomatic Secret.

Repeat to:

WASHINGTON. 10161

~~JERUSALEM~~

CAIRO 1846

BAGDAD 839

JEDDA 398

AMMAN 433

BEIRUT 614

DAMASCUS. 511

Copy Minutes of  
Meeting

M.

3/0

A 511

Copy both fets to  
Mr. Morrison (W.A.C.)

Co. who will  
arrange to transmit  
the text with the  
necessary instructions  
to Jerusalem

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

IMPORTANT

DEDIP

SECRET.

Following for Colonial Secretary and  
Minister of State from the Secretary of  
State.

The Prime Minister and I have been  
considering the reactions to date to our  
statement on Palestine of September 26th.  
It strikes us that both the Arabs and the  
Jews, and possibly also the United States,  
are treating with some amount of scepticism  
our announcement that we would withdraw  
both arms and administration from Palestine  
in the absence of a settlement. We do not  
want publicly to confront the United States  
with a deadline by making any further  
public pronouncement at the moment, but we  
suggest that you should take ~~take~~ any  
opportunity in conversations with Americans  
and Representatives of Jews and Arabs to  
make it clear that they must be in no doubt  
of our determined intention to carry out  
the policy contained in your statement of  
September 26th. Neither can they assume  
that the delay can be very long before we  
withdraw after it has become plain that  
~~there is no hope of a settlement is impossible.~~

~~TOP SECRET.~~

2. We

~~For your own private information,~~

~~but not for use in your conversations, the~~

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Reference: FO 371 / 61790

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76

~~the Prime Minister, Minister of Defence and~~  
I have been thinking of a maximum period  
of six months, subject to the final views of  
our military experts on the practicable date  
of withdrawal. No period should be mentioned  
in your conversations but the shortness of  
time can be emphasised.

2. ~~X~~. We think it important that those  
concerned should realise that there is  
increasing restiveness on the part of H.M.G.  
and the public generally at our very  
difficult situation. Illegal immigration  
~~it appears~~ is still being encouraged. If  
Palestine were British territory we should  
be able to deal with the situation. As  
things are, we are bound by the provisions  
of the Mandate which we have loyally  
attempted to carry out.

3. ~~X~~. Silver's statement as reported in today's  
press makes it all the more important that  
the Jews and the Americans should be  
brought to understand the true position. I  
am anxious that Marshall personally shall  
know where we stand. I am also instructing  
H.M. Representatives with the Arab Governments  
(see my telegram repeated to you as my  
immediately following telegram) to bring the  
position home to them.

202

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

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Reference: **FO 371 / 61790**

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[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on]

E /G

Cypher/OTP.

DIPLOMATIC (SECRET)

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO NEW YORK

(To United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations)

No. 5318.

D. 2.35 a.m. 4th October, 1947.

3rd October, 1947.

Repeated to Washington No. 10161, Cairo No. 1846, Bagdad No. 839,  
Jedda No. 398, Amman No. 433, Beirut No. 614,  
Damascus No. 511.

IMPORTANT.

DEDIP.

SECRET.

Following for Colonial Secretary and Minister of State from the Secretary of State.

The Prime Minister and I have been considering the reactions to date to our statement on Palestine of September 26th. It strikes us that both the Arabs and the Jews, and possibly also the United States, are treating with some amount of scepticism our announcement that we would withdraw both arms and administration from Palestine in the absence of a settlement. We do not want publicly to confront the United States with a deadline by making any further public pronouncement at the moment, but we suggest that you should take any opportunity in conversations with Americans and Representatives of Jews and Arabs to make it clear that they must be in no doubt of our determined intention to carry out the policy contained in your statement of September 26th. Neither can they assume that the delay can be very long before we withdraw after it has become plain that a settlement is impossible.

2. We think it important that these concerned should realise that there is increasing restiveness on the part of His Majesty's Government and the public generally at our very difficult situation. Illegal immigration is still being encouraged. If Palestine were British territory we should be able to deal with the situation. As things are, we are bound by the provisions of the Mandate which we have loyally attempted to carry out.

3. Silver's statement as reported in today's press makes it all the more important that the Jews and the Americans should be brought to understand the true position. I am anxious that Marshall personally shall know where we stand. I am also instructing His Majesty's Representatives with the Arab Governments (see my telegram repeated to you as my immediately following telegram) to bring the position home to them.

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Reference: **FO 371 / 61790**

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E9254/46/S.



78

AMENDED DISTRIBUTION (7TH OCTOBER, 1947)

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on].

E /G  
Cypher/OTP

CABINET DISTRIBUTION

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO NEW YORK  
(To United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations)

No. 3318  
3rd October, 1947

D. 2.35 a.m. 4th October, 1947

Repeated to Washington No.10161; Cairo No. 1846;  
Bagdad No.839; Jedda No.398; Amman No.433;  
Beirut No.614; Damascus No.511.

IMPORTANT

DEDIP

SECRET

Following for Colonial Secretary and Minister of State from the Secretary of State.

The Prime Minister and I have been considering the reactions to date to our statement on Palestine of September 26th. It strikes us that both the Arabs and the Jews, and possibly also the United States, are treating with some amount of scepticism our announcement that we would withdraw both arms and administration from Palestine in the absence of a settlement. We do not want publicly to confront the United States with a deadline by making any further public pronouncement at the moment, but we suggest that you should take any opportunity in conversations with Americans and Representatives of Jews and Arabs to make it clear that they must be in no doubt of our determined intention to carry out the policy contained in your statement of September 26th. Neither can they assume that the delay can be very long before we withdraw after it has become plain that a settlement is impossible.

2. We think it important that those concerned should realise that there is increasing restiveness on the part of His Majesty's Government and the public generally at our very difficult situation. Illegal immigration is still being encouraged. If Palestine were British territory we should be able to deal with the situation. As things are, we are bound by the provisions of the Mandate which we have loyally attempted to carry out.

3. Silver's statement as reported in today's press makes it all the more important that the Jews and the Americans should be brought to understand the true position. I am anxious that Marshall personally shall know where we stand. I am also instructing His Majesty's Representatives with the Arab Governments (see my telegram repeated to you as my immediately following telegram) to bring the position home to them.

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Reference: **FO 371** / 61790



Registry  
No. E

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B 79

P.D.

Despatched 2 2019 M. 10

Draft

~~JERUSALEM~~

CAIRO 1847  
BAGDAD 840  
JEDDA 399

AMMAN 434

BEIRUT 615

DAMASCUS 512

IMPORTANT.

DEDIP

SECRET.

My telegram to New York No..... [A] 3318

You should use the material contained in my telegram under reference in conversations with the Government to which you are accredited.

2. I feel that the Arabs as a whole have been treating this serious question much too lightly. ~~While we want their friendship and help, they must understand that we resent it when our honest efforts in Palestine are criticised. Such an attitude on the part of the Arab States merely brings them into disrepute in the end.~~

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

No....

Cypher

Diplomatic Secret

Repeat to:

Sir A. Cadogan,  
NEW YORK 3319  
WASHINGTON 10162

Copy to  
of

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Reference: FO 371 / 61790







NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

3149 Wt. 26469/137 100m 9/46 (51) F.&S.

Registry No.

E

Top Secret.  
 Secret.  
 Confidential.  
 Restricted.  
 Open.

Draft.

Sir A. Cadogan  
N. York

Telegram.

No. 3320

(Date) 3/10/47

Repeat to:-

Washington 10163  
Personal for Ambassador

~~En Clair.~~

~~Code.~~

~~Cypher.~~

Distribution:-

Diplomatic  
Secret

Copies to:-

Minister of  
Defence

F.O.,

MC

32

4/11/1947.

Despatched 2.30 a.m.

IMPORTANT

TOP SECRET

DE YOU

A

My tel. no. 3318 [of Oct. 3:  
Palestine]

Following for Colonial  
Sec. and Min. of State  
from the Sec. of State.

For your own private  
information, but not for  
use in your conversations,  
the Prime Minister, Min.  
of Defence and I have  
been thinking of a  
maximum period of  
Six

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1	2	3	4	5	6

Reference: FO 371 / 61790

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83  
Six months, subject to the  
final views of our military  
experts on the practicable  
rate of withdrawal. No  
period should be  
mentioned in your  
conversations but the  
shortness of time can  
be emphasised.

B out. 3

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

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Reference:

**FO 371 / 61790**



OUTWARD TELEGRAM

E9254/G

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(green)

75872/154/13/47

Cypher (O.T.P.)

TO PALESTINE (General Sir A. Cunningham)

FROM S. OF S. COLONIES.

Sent 4th October, 1947. 13.30 hrs.

MOST IMMEDIATE

No. 2359 Top Secret.

My immediately following telegram contains text of personal message from Foreign Secretary to Colonial Secretary and Minister of State in New York. Message has been repeated to His Majesty's representatives at Arab posts with instructions to use the material contained therein in conversations with the governments to which they are accredited.

2. No doubt you will find opportunity to make His Majesty's Government's attitude perfectly clear to Arabs and Jews in Palestine where the reaction appears to be very similar to that which Foreign Secretary finds so unsatisfactory.

Distributed to:-

R. 243	Mr. Trafford Smith
Secretary of State	Mr. Gutch
Sir T. Lloyd	Mr. Mathieson
Mr. I. Thomas	Mr. Higham
Sir S. Gaine	Mr. Galsworthy
Sir C. Jeffries	Mr. Fitzgerald
Mr. Holding	
Mr. Martin	
Foreign Office	- Mr. J.G.S. Beith.

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References:  
**FO 371 / 61790**

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9 OCT 1947  
OUTWARD TELEGRAM

EQ254 / G

75872/154/13/47

Cypher (O.T.P.)

TO PALESTINE (General Sir A. Cunningham)

FROM S. OF S., COLONIES.

Sent 4th October, 1947. 13.45 hrs.

MOST IMMEDIATE

No. 2360 Top Secret.

My immediately preceding telegram. Text begins. The Prime Minister and I have been considering the reactions to date to our statement on Palestine of September 26th. It strikes us that both the Arabs and the Jews, and possibly also the United States, are treating with some amount of scepticism our announcement that we would withdraw both arms and administration from Palestine in the absence of a settlement. We do not want publicly to confront the United States with a deadline by making any further public pronouncement at the moment, but we suggest that you should take any opportunity in conversations with Americans and representatives of Jews and Arabs to make it clear that they must be in no doubt of our determined intention to carry out the policy contained in your statement of September 26th. Neither can they assume that the delay can be very long before we withdraw after it has become plain that a settlement is impossible.

2. We think it important that those concerned should realise that there is increasing restiveness on the part of His Majesty's Government and the public generally at our very difficult situation. Illegal immigration is still being encouraged. If Palestine were British territory we should be able to deal with the situation. As things are, we are bound by the provisions of the Mandate which we have loyally attempted to carry out.

3. Silver's statement as reported in today's press makes it all the more important that the Jews and the Americans should be brought to understand the true position. I am anxious that

Marshall/

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Reference:

FO 371 / 61790

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87

Marshall personally shall know where we stand. I am also instructing His Majesty's Representatives with the Arab Governments to bring the position home to them. Text ends.

Distributed to:-

R. 243  
Secretary of State  
Sir T. Lloyd  
Mr. I. Thomas  
Sir S. Caine  
Sir C. Jeffries  
Mr. Holding  
Mr. Martin  
Foreign Office

Mr. Trafford Smith  
Mr. Gutch  
Mr. Mathieson  
Mr. Higham  
Mr. Galsworthy  
Mr. Fitzgerald

- Mr. J.G.S. Beith.

7 OCT 37

10 10 37

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Reference:					
<b>FO 371 / 61790</b>					

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63

Palestine

EQ299/G

EASTERN

17 Oct 47

102 1947  
31

EQ299/46/C

Future procedure regarding  
Palestine

F.O. Pin

Dated 4 Oct  
Received 7 Oct.

Last Paper

(Minutes)

References

See within

1. New York 2743 4 Oct.

Last sentence of Fo tel. no. 3325 to  
N. York : Mr Burrows is working on  
a paper by the Private Sec. with  
the S/S's thoughts on the further  
line to be taken by the Colonial  
Sec.

(Print)

(How disposed of)

FO New York  
3325  
4 Oct.

J.S. [unclear]  
Oct. 8

(Action completed)

(Index)

25/10

[Signature]

Next Paper

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THIS TELEGRAM HAS BEEN <sup>91</sup>  
CIRCULATED TO :

No. <sup>1</sup>..... *with*

Secretary of State. *green*

Sir O. Sargent.....

Mr. C.F.A. Warner...

Eastern Department.

P.S. to Mr. Lord Thomas

Sir E. Bridges

Sir R. Brook

[33547-1]

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References: **FO 371 / 61790**



92



Cypher/OTP

P R I S E C

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

(From U.K. Delegation to United Nations)

No. 2773.

D. 12.20. p.m.

4th October 1947.

4th October 1947.

R. 7.35. p.m.

4th October 1947.

IMMEDIATE

SECRET

Foreign Secretary from Colonial Secretary.

Your telegram No. 3325.

Debate on Palestine is proceeding but neither Americans nor Russians have yet spoken. They will speak probably early next week. Scope of debate covers whole problem including British statement and recommendations of Fact Finding Commission. Later next week the suggestions made by delegates for crystallising action will be studied. I shall probably at end of general debate answer a few criticisms of British policy and reiterate our sense of the urgency of the matter but must be guided by how things develop. It is premature to indicate a date for withdrawal but it is imperative that we continue to make it understood that we are not dawdling. Delegations and press generally here appreciate this.

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Reference:

**FO 371 / 61790**

624

1947

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E 9315

93

PALESTINE

Registry Number

E 9315/46/31

FROM

Legation Budapest

No.

292.

Dated

Received in Registry

1 Oct  
7 Oct

Hungarian Institute - Jerusalem

Copy of note from Hungarian Mly of Education n 62.512/6 of 26 Sept, stating that Dr. Isidor Scher has been appointed director of Hungarian Institute at Hebrew University - Jerusalem. Requesting that the Institute be granted privileges enjoyed by similar institutes.

Last Paper

9299

References

10220/46/17

(Print)

(How disposed of)

15/ Wackerstein  
B.O.

Oct 14

In pp. 2) Acknowledge.  
31 Oct.

(Action completed)

P.L. 20/10

(Index)

[Handwritten signature]

Next Paper

9318

(Minutes.)

Copy to Mr. Mullerstein (c.o.)

for his comments.

B.V. 18/10

[Handwritten signature] 3/10

I have spoken to c.o.

B.V. 28/10

[Handwritten signature] 20/10

g.a.p.p. B.O. tel 2105 Saviny 2/10

to mt. 23

g.a.p.p. Hungarian Legation 5172/1947 27/10

... to be entered  
separately please  
J.B. [unclear]

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Reference: FO 371 / 61790

292. (360/1/47)

94 E.

Charge  
HIS Majesty's d'Affaires at Budapest  
presents his compliments to The Rt.Hon. Ernest Bevin, M.P.  
and has the honour to transmit to him the under-mentioned  
documents.

British....Legation,.....  
.....Budapest.....

.1st. October,., 194..7..

Reference to previous correspondence:

*Description of Enclosure.*

Name and Date.	Subject.
Verbal Note from Hungarian Ministry of Education ref 62.512/6 dated 26/9/47.	Dr. Tibor Scher appointed director of Hungarian Institute at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem. Requesting that this Institute be granted privileges enjoyed by similar institutes.

3479A 33014-1 (8)

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Reference:

FO 371 / 61790

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To Foreign Office

E 9215 / 46 / 71

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76220 / 47

U.S. of S. Colonial Office

Date 21st. October 1947

Reference E 9315 / 46 / 31 of 14th. October 1947

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Reference:

FO

371

61790

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78230/47

**Saving.**

From the Secretary of State for the Colonies.

To the Officer Administering the Government of.....

Date 21 October, 1947

No. 2105 Saving.

Your Savingsgram No. 487 of the  
17th April.

Hungarian Institute at the Hebrew  
University, Jerusalem.

I enclose for your consideration a  
copy of verbal note delivered by Hungarian  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs to British  
Legation in Budapest.

SECRET.

97

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Reference: FO 371 / 61790



PERSONAL

Rt. Hon. Ernest Bevin, M.P.  
Foreign Office,  
Whitehall.

Dear Mr Bevin,

I am obliged to you for your telephone communication of this afternoon, although disappointed that you were unable to send the Association of Jewish Ex-Servicemen the message I suggested. I appreciate your reasons for not doing so, and respect your judgment in the matter.

At the same time, may I say that the mistaken belief among many Jews that you, who have been a lifelong opponent of racialism, are actuated by anti-semitism, has poisoned the atmosphere in which the question of Palestine has been considered. This belief has spread among people holding varying views; among many who are moved by malice towards the Jews; among others who will beat Britain with any stick; and among yet others who are friendly to Britain but have misunderstood her motives.

Whatever the settlement of the Palestine dispute, I, as a Briton and a member of the Jewish faith, want to see a return of the good

30th September, 1947.

*SJS*  
*E. Bevin*  
*99*  
*E. 9. 18*

*Ernest Bevin*  
*to Mr Bevin*  
*99*

*I will not*  
*promise that*  
*473*

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Reference:

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100

RECEIVED IN O.B.
7 OCT 1947
SENT TO DEP.
8 - OCT 1947

spirit between Britain and the Jews which marked their past relations.

I felt that the memorial parade of the Jewish Ex-Servicemen was an appropriate occasion for a message of goodwill, condemning anti-semitism.

Although you do not share my view of the timeliness of such a message, I most earnestly hope that you will dispel as soon as possible the false impression that anti-semitism is an ingredient of British foreign policy. If that is done, I am of the opinion that the Palestine issue will be more readily settled, and Anglo-U. S. relations rid of a painful irritant.

Yours sincerely,

*Maurice Edelman*

Maurice Edelman

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Reference: **FO 371 / 61790**

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101

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E 9322

1947

PALESTINE

Registry Number

E 9322/44/31

FROM

40 Minute

No.

4. Ashton -

Dated

Guaranteed

Received in Registry

5 Oct  
8 -

Palestine Question

Transmit views of Miss Calverley on Palestine, who thinks very rapid development anticipated as soon as the long-suffering British military force is removed. It seems inevitable that there will be an outbreak of mass murder very soon after the doors open to unlimited Jewish entry.

Last Paper

9318

References

(Print)

(How disposed of)

(Minutes.)

Miss Calverley's suggestions are sensible but impracticable.

*John*  
C.F. & CARL  
8/10

The Americans have a heavy responsibility for all that Miss Calverley describes in para. 3 - and they have been faced with it for the first time by our statement of Sept. 26<sup>th</sup>

Mr Ashton-Gwatkin  
JAG. 16/10

Dr. J. - Beins  
O.A. P

The first para. is interesting

(Action completed)

*G. E. 17/10*

(Index)

*[Signature]*

Next Paper

E 9330

39538

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Reference: FO 371 / 61790

*R. Gannan*  
8/X

*GASB*  
9-X



Minutes. 102

Eastern Dept.

E 9522

This is from Miss Calverley, dated September 30th, from Cairo; she is on her way to Abydos to continue research work in the temples. She is rather verbose, but quite observant and intelligent.

F. Ashmofwathin  
5/10/47

"With the Palestine affair boiling up owing to the recent decisions, very rapid developments are expected as soon as the restraining hold of the long-suffering British policing Force is removed. It seems inevitable that there will be an outbreak of mass murder very soon after the doors open to unlimited Jewish entry, and there is no knowing how far that will spread or how long it will last. There are some significant indications of trouble ahead - for instance, the Armenians are leaving en masse, and the Greeks are also getting the wind up, as are the Copts, and the feeling is that the Jewish situation will speed up the anti-foreign and anti-Christian movement here, but the Egyptian side of the question is not what I am most worried about, moreover, the present agitation over the cholera epidemic may be a blessing in disguise, as it may distract the quarrelsome.

What I want to urge is this: if, NOW, an alternative to Palestine as a Jewish National home were arranged for and prepared (never mind if it has been refused till now) I feel sure that many of the less fanatical Jews would be only too glad to go there to settle in security before the real trouble gets started, also the D.P.s in Camps could be given the option of being taken there; then, when the mess in Palestine becomes intolerable, others will be only too glad of a place to go, where they can get down to making homes and settling into decent lives.

One thing must be done and done at once, and that is to stop money and arms being sent to the Jews in Palestine (in America collections were being made openly for this purpose; I saw it myself), it is adding to the fuel of hate and mistrust in the Arab peoples, and, as so many Egyptians and other members of Arab Nations have been and are in the States, this form of Jewish activity is much talked about - in any case it brings disaster and murder, which will have to be paid for by those who abuse humanity in this way - why cannot these people who seem to have so much money to throw on the fire be induced to use it to the purpose of supplying material aid for helping to settle the Jews in some degree of

comfort/

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103 END

comfort? - - possibly, if all money and arms were seized, a fund might be started on these lines!

If the preparation of a territory for the Jews is approved, it must be started on at once so that it is ready for the new flood of refugees that will pour out of Palestine when conditions of life become impossible. Nobody will want them as citizens after their behaviour and they must go somewhere.

It is expected that with the first rumour of an attack on Arabs by the Jews there will be a massacre of every Jewish man, woman and child in Damascus, and this will be followed by reprisals and set off the same game elsewhere including the Jews in Alexandria (an Egyptian in a fairly high Government position advanced this view and I've heard much the same elsewhere).

There's bound to be a bust up, I fear, but can't we (or U.N.O.) arrange so that it's "out of the frying-pan" on to a plate - instead of the fire?"

RECEIVED IN C.D.  
7 OCT 1947  
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18 - OCT

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